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The materials that follow present the following questions, among others.
1. Were the efforts of California lawyers to help persons of Japanese descent evade the
prohibitions of the Alien Land Laws ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
2. Were Attorney General Warren’s efforts to use those laws as a premise for creating a
record to support exclusion ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
3. Was Warren’s agreement to expand his map project and law enforcement meetings
beyond counties where his office thought a case provable under the Alien Land Law
might exist ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
4. Was James Rowe’s reported disclosure to the ACLU that General DeWitt was
contemplating mass exclusion ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
5. Was Attorney General Biddle’s decision to defer to military officials and to hand the
problem off to them—his choice not to object flatly on constitutional grounds—
ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
6. Was prosecution of Alien Land Law cases after exclusion and internment occurred
ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
7. Was James Purcell’s tactical delay in waiting to press for a decision on Mitsuye
Endo’s habeas petition ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
8. Were Karl Bendetsen’s authorship of the DeWitt report and related actions promoting
exclusion ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
9. Were Edward Ennis’s and John Burling’s reported disclosures to the ACLU
pertaining to Ex parte Endo, and Ennis’s reported consultation with Baldwin
concerning both Endo and Korematsu, ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
10. Was John McCloy’s revision of the original DeWitt report ethical? Was it improper
lawyering?
11. Were Edward Ennis’s and John Burling’s advocacy of disclosure in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
12. Was Herbert Wechsler’s rewriting of note 2 in the Korematsu brief ethical? Was it
improper lawyering?
13. Ennis and Burling signed briefs in Korematsu notwithstanding the absence of
disclosure. Should they have resigned?
14. Was the DOJ’s failure to disclose FBI, FCC, and ONI documents inconsistent with
General DeWitt’s report ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
15. Was coordination between General DeWitt’s staff and West Coast states on those
states’ amicus briefs in Hirabayashi and Korematsu ethical? Was it improper
lawyering?
16. Was the JACL’s use of a WRA non-lawyer employee to write a substantial portion of
the JACL amicus briefs in those cases ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
17. Who were “responsible persons” as referenced by Solicitor General Fahy at the
Korematsu argument?
18. Was Fahy’s Korematsu argument itself ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
19. Should Justice Roberts and Justice Frankfurter have recused themselves in view of
Roberts’s report on Pearl Harbor and the influence it had on exclusion?
20. What kind of a client was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
21. Do you find Professor Wechsler’s reasons for proceeding with the Korematsu brief
persuasive?
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Between 1942 and 1946, approximately 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were
ordered to leave their homes and were transported to internment camps where they were held
under armed guard. 1 Four cases litigated before the United States Supreme Court dealt with
orders related to this policy: Hirabayishi v. United States, 2 Yasui v. United States, 3 Korematsu v.
United States, 4 and ex parte Endo. 5 Property deprivation related to internment was at issue in
Oyama v. California. 6 This note discusses whether the Solicitor General of the United States
violated a duty of candor in Hirabayashi and Yasui or in Korematsu. That question requires
analysis of subsidiary questions relating to representation of entity clients generally, and of
government clients in particular. It also provides opportunity for analysis of broader questions
regarding the extent of the duty of loyalty.
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Standard reference works on the topics covered include Carey McWilliams, PREJUDICE: JAPANESE-AMERICANS,
SYMBOL OF RACIAL INTOLERANCE (1944); Ruth E. McKee, United States Department of Interior, WARTIME EXILE:
THE EXCLUSION OF THE JAPANESE AMERICANS FROM THE WEST COAST (1946); Dorothy Swaine Thomas & Richard
S. Nishimoto, THE SPOILAGE (1946); Morton Grodzins, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE
EVACUATION (1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, PREJUDICE, WAR, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1954); Roger Daniels, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION (1962) (2ND Ed. 1977)(hereinafter Daniels, Politics); The
United States Army, II: THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS
(Washington, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (1964)); Audrie Girdner & Anne
Loftis, THE GREAT BETRAYAL, THE EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II (1969);
Frank F. Chuman, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE, THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS (1976); Michi Weglyn, YEARS OF
INFAMY (1976); Roger Daniels, CONCENTRATION CAMPS: NORTH AMERICA (Revised Ed. 1981); PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1982); Peter
Irons, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)(hereinafter, Irons, Justice At War); Charles McClain, Ed. THE MASS INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS (1984); Roger Daniels, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE
THE JAPANESE AMERICANS (1986)(hereinafter Daniels, Decision); JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE LAW (Charles
McClain, Ed. 1994); Tetsuden Kashima, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL 29 (2003); Klancy Klark de Nevers, THE
COLONEL AND THE PACIFIST (2004); Roger Daniels, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES: THE RULE OF LAW IN TIME OF
WAR (hereinafter Daniels, Rule of Law)(2013). Works on the pre-internment treatment of Japanese persons include
Herbert B. Johnson, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF THE REAL SITUATION 69-71
(1907); California State Board of Control, CALIFORNIA AND THE ORIENTAL (1922); Raymond Leslie Buell, The
Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States I, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 605 (1922); Raymond Leslie
Buell, The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States II, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 57 (1923); Raymond
Leslie Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese Question, 17 AM. J. INT’L LAW. 29 (1923)(hereinafter Buell, Legal
Aspects).
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3
320 U.S. 115 (1943).
4
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5
323 U.S. 283 (1944).
6
332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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I
A
Most internees lived in California, so California law provides relevant background to
internment. Before it became a state, persons resident in California were in principle subject to
Mexican law. 7 The Gold Rush brought immigrants from the Eastern United States, who were
ignorant of Mexican law and who sought to enforce common law principles as custom. 8 When it
became a state, California immediately repealed all existing laws, 9 replacing them with the
common law. 10 From the first legislative session California enacted laws drawing racial
categories. In 1850, California voided all marriages “of white persons with negroes or

7

J. Ross Browne, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE
FORMATION OF A STATE CONSTITUTION (1850) Appendix at xxv; Walter Colton, THREE YEARS IN
CALIFORNIA 249 (1850); Stephen J. Field, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA 21 (1893).
8
The situation is surveyed in David McGowan, California’s Duty of Confidentiality: A Case Study in Code
Interpretation, https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=32213, at 32-35.
9
Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 125, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf.
10
Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 95, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf.
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mulattoes,” 11 a prohibition expanded in 1901 to prohibit marriage between white persons and
“Mongolians.” 12 Japanese persons were counted as “Mongolians” for purposes of this law. 13
In 1850 California also enacted that “[n]o black or mulatto person, or Indian,” could
testify for or against a white person in a criminal matter. 14 Anyone with 50% or more “Indian”
blood was deemed an Indian; 1/8 “Negro” blood or more made a person a “mulatto.” 15 In
People v. Hall, 16 the California Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction that rested on
testimony from Chinese persons. The defendant was white, the victim Chinese. The Court
reasoned that the legislature intended to protect “the White person from the influence of all
testimony other than that of persons of the same caste. The use of these terms must, by every
sound rule of construction, exclude every one who is not of white blood.” 17 The court suggested
that Chinese witnesses could be considered “Indian,” but concluded that the reference to “black”
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Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 140, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf. Solemnization of
such a marriage was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of from $100 to $10,000 and imprisonment for a term of
from three months to ten year. Id. § 4. In 1851 it was enacted that any “white male citizen” 21 years or older could
become an attorney. Statutes of California, 1851 Chap. 4, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1851/1851.pdf.
12
The history is recounted in Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948), which struck the law on equal protection
grounds. In the complex racial/legal politics surrounding California’s anti-miscegenation laws, persons of Mexican
ancestry could be treated as “white,” and thus were able to marry white people but not Black or “Mongolian”
people, although in popular understanding they were “Mexican.” See Dara Orenstein, Void for Vagueness:
Mexicans and the Collapse of Miscegenation Law in California, 74 PAC. HIST. REV. 377 (2005). This complexity is
reflected in a 1933 amendment that expand the law to forbid marriages between whites and “Malay” persons, an
amendment that responded to a judicial ruling that person of Philippine ancestry are not “Mongolians.” Roldan v.
Los Angeles County, 129 Cal. App. 267 (1933). The opinion in Roldan issued in January 1933. The statute was
amended on April 20, 1933. Because the statutory text specified that all marriages within the statutory prohibition
were “illegal and void,” the amendment vitiated the marriage. For a history of the case, and of treatment of
Philippine persons under such laws, see Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in
California, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795 (2000).
13
See Roldan, 129 Cal. App. At 268-69.
14
Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 99(14), available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf.
15
Id. This prohibition applied even when a Black person was the victim of a crime committed by a white person. In
People v. Howard, 17 Cal. 63 (1860), Stephen Field, then California Chief Justice, and future United States Supreme
Court justice, held that the prohibition of Section 14 took precedence over Section 13, which made the victim of a
crime a competent witness.
16
4 Cal. 399 (1854). This conclusion renders the other two categories named in the statute surplusage, thus
violating a basic rule of statutory construction. The Court probably was not wrong about the legislature’s subjective
intention, however, as shown by the 1863 amendment mentioned above.
17
Id. at 403. The opinion does not recite the facts in any detail. It appears that George Hall was indicted for the
murder of Ling Sing in Nevada County. In the course of an attempted robbery of a Chinese mining camp, Hall shot
Sing in the back with a shotgun. John Hall and Samuel Wiseman were indicted as accessories. The prosecution
called twelve witnesses, three of whom were Chinese. The defense did not object on the ground of the statute.
George Hall was convicted and sentenced to hang. His brother, John, and Wiseman were acquitted. Failure to object
at trial notwithstanding, the Court reversed Hall’s conviction. He was not retried, because one of the principal white
witnesses was dead and the other could not be found. Michael Traynor, The Infamous Case of People v. Hall, Cal.
Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc’y Newsletter, Spring/Summer 2017. For a survey of racial limitations on Chinese witnesses, see
Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in Court: Asian Pacific Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 965 (2013).

4

witnesses “necessarily excludes all races other than the Caucasian.” 18 A similar provision
applied to civil cases. 19
In 1863 the Crimes Act was amended to remove the prohibition against Black persons
testifying; the amended act provided that no “Indian, or person having on half or more of Indian
blood, or Mongolian, or Chinese shall be permitted to give evidence in the courts of the state in
favor of or against any white person.” 20 A corresponding amendment was made to the statute
governing civil cases. 21 Both prohibitions were impliedly repeated with the adoption of the
Codes in 1872. 22 As this history suggests, California’s first experience with Asian
discrimination focused on Chinese immigrants, who came to work on, among other things, the
Trans-Continental railroad. Anti-Chinese prejudice was high among certain classes, and
California enacted laws, and obtained federal action, designed to reduce the number of Chinese
immigrants in the state. 23 Ironically in view of later events, Professor Roger Daniels concluded
that early Japanese settlers in the United States “were received with great favor.” 24

18

4 Cal. at 404.
Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 142(306), available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf.. In 1851, the
legislature lowered the fraction pertaining to “Indian” persons to ¼. Statutes of California, 1851, Chap. 5 (394)(3),
available at https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1850/1850.pdf.
California also enacted its own fugitive slave law in 1852, a portion of which precluded testimony from a person
claimed to be a fugitive. Statutes of California, 1850, Chap. 33(1), available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1852/1852.PDF.
20
Statutes of California, 1863, Chap. 70, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1863/1863.PDF. This prohibition
was upheld against a challenge based on the Fourteenth Amendment in People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870), which
reversed the conviction of a white man accused of stealing a watch from a Chinese person because the victim was
allowed to testify.
21
Statutes of California, 1863, Chap. 68(3), available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1863/1863.PDF.
22
People v. McGuire, 45 Cal. 56, 57 (1872)(“the Legislature, by the passage of the Codes, has repealed all laws
which exclude Chinamen from testifying in actions to which white men are parties.”).
23
Raymond Leslie Buell, The Development of Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 605,
606 (1922). Through a series of state and federal laws and overt hostility California had reduced its Chinese
population from 132,000 in 1882 to 61,639 in 1920. Examples include the Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. (1882)
58. The original act was temporary but was extended to effectively become permanent, until repealed in 1943.
Edwin E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CAL. L. REV. 61, 63 n. 14
(1947).
24
Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 3.
19
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B
Japan historically prohibited emigration. 25 When it relaxed that prohibition, some
Japanese citizens emigrated to Hawai’i, agreeing to indentured labor contracts as a condition of
entry. 26 The United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, and these agreements were abrogated. Many
Japanese persons then left Hawaii for California, and immigration from Japan continued. 27
Economics supported this immigration. Wages in Japan were low while labor in California—
particularly agricultural labor—was at a premium, in part because California had succeeded in
reducing its Chinese population.
Japanese immigration to California provoked reaction, in part because the immigrants
sought to better their economic position. In 1900, a meeting sponsored by the San Francisco
Labor Council passed a resolution calling for extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act to exclude
Japanese immigrants as well. 28 James D. Phelan, then mayor of San Francisco and later a
California senator, spoke at the meeting. In 1903, certain Japanese farm laborers hired to pick
tree fruits demanded to renegotiate their contracts when the fruit had ripened and needed to be

25

Buell, Agitation, supra note 1; Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 2.
Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 5-6; Buell, Agitation I, supra note 1, at 606-608; 614; For a brief overview, see
Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to Internment, 40
BOS. COLL. L. REV. 37, 45 (1998).
27
Ferguson, 35 CAL. L. REV. at 63-64; Buell, Agitation, supra note 1, at 606-07.
28
Buell, Agitation, supra note 1 at 608-09; Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 21-22.
26
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picked. 29 In 1904, The American Federation of Labor, keen to reduce competition from
Japanese workers, called for extension of the Exclusion Act to exclude Japanese immigration. 30
In 1905 a Japanese and Korean Exclusion League was formed in San Francisco, and an antiJapanese convention was held in the city. 31 It advocated boycotts of Japanese-owned business,
among other things. 32 The dispute was conducted in strikingly modern terms. One Fresno fruit
grower wrote the San Francisco Chronicle that “the Japanese and Chinese do a class of labor that
white men cannot do, and will not do at any price. It is not a question of cheap labor, or efficient
labor, but of laborers of any kind at any price.” 33 When a world-renowned Japanese
seismologist, Dr. Omori, visited California following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake to study
its effects, he was hit with a thrown rock and pelted with sand and dust in San Francisco, and
punched in the jaw in Eureka, apparently on the presumption that he was attempting to break a
local labor strike. 34
C
Primary education drew racial lines as well. California’s 1850 and 1851 school statutes
imposed no racial limitation. 35 An 1860 amendment provided that “Negroes, Mongolians, and
Indians, shall not be admitted into the public schools.” 36 A district violating this provision risked
losing its share of state funds. The amendment further provided, however, that districts could
establish, and spend public money on, “a separate school for the education of Negroes,
Mongolians, and Indians” and could use public money for that purpose. 37 An 1870 amendment
29

Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 9. Growers apparently complained that Chinese laborers had not done such
things.
30
Id. at 609. For a good theoretical discussion of the relationship between existing labor organizations and entrants
such as the Japanese, see Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market, 37 AM. SOC.
REV. 547 (1972).
31
Johnson, supra note 1, 69-71. Johnson was a Methodist missionary who lived for 20 years in Japan. Daniels
refers to this as the Asiatic Exclusion League, Daniels, Politics, supra note 1 at 28, a name that appears to have been
adopted after 1905.
32
Id. at 618.
33
Quoted in Johnson, supra note 1, at 42.
34
Id. at 73-75. Daniels suggests that Omori’s presumably formal attire would have made it hard to mistake him for a
strikebreaker. Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 33.
35
The 1851 statute establishing schools provided, for example, that funding would be calculated based on the whole
number of children in the State, without reference to race. Statutes of California, 1851, Chap. 126(II)(i), available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1851/1851.pdf. An 1855 amendment
tied apportionment to the number of “white children” in a school district. Statutes of California, 1855, Chap. 185,
sec; 12, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1855/1855.PDF#page=241
36
Statutes of California, 1860, Chap. 329, § 8, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1860/1860.PDF#page=351.
37
An 1866 amendment reflects the complex racial politics of the day. It provided that, unless otherwise provided by
law, schools were open “for the admission of all white children” between five and 21 residing in a school district,
though for good cause a school board could admit adults or children residing out of the district. (§ 53). The law
further provided that a district could, by majority vote of the trustees or board, “admit into any public school halfbreed Indian children, and Indian children who live in white families or under guardianship of white persons.”
(§ 56). It also provided that “Indian children not living under the care of white persons” and “[c]hildren of African
or Mongolian descent” could not be admitted. If ten or more parents or guardians of such children petitioned for the
creation of a separate school, however, then such a school “shall be established.” Trustees had discretion to provide
for the (presumably separate) education of a smaller number of such students. Finally, the law provided that when
any number of non-white students were present “whose education can be provided for in no other way,” a majority
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continued the provision for separate schools, but the reference to “Mongolian” children was
omitted, so even separate schools no longer had to teach Chinese children. 38
Codification in 1872 moved these provisions into the Political Code. Under Section 1662
of the 1872 Political Code, schools were open to “all white children” between the ages of five
and 21 residing in the relevant district. Presumably this section was meant to exclude both
Chinese and Japanese children, though the Japanese population in 1872 was not large. 39 Section
1669 of the 1872 Code stated that “[t]he education of children of African descent, and Indian
children, must be provided for in separate schools.” 40 An 1874 amendment added a proviso that
if a district failed to provide separate schools for such children, then they “must be admitted to
the schools for white children.” 41 This amendment reflected the influence of Ward v. Flood, 42
which upheld segregated schools only where schools for excluded children actually had been
created. An 1880 amendment to Section 1662 omitted the word “white,” and Section 1669 was
deleted altogether. 43 In 1885, the absence of racially discriminatory language led the Court, in
Tape v. Hurley, 44 to order the admission to a public school of a Chinese student. On March 5,
1885, the Superintendent of San Francisco schools published a letter in the Alta California
urging the legislature to authorize the creation of segregated schools, stating “[w]ithout such
action I have every reason to believe that some of our classes will be inundated by Mongolians.
Trouble will follow.” 45 On March 12, 1885, Section 1662 was amended to allow the
establishment of “separate schools for the children of Mongolian or Chinese descent” and to
preclude such children from attending other schools when a separate school had been
established. 46
This language was in effect when, in 1905, the San Francisco School Board passed a
resolution to segregate both Japanese and Chinese children in schools. 47 The statute did not
reference Japanese persons, and the text differed from the language construed in People v. Hall
because Black students were not excluded. 48 Presumably the Board thought “Mongolian” broad

of trustees could “permit such children to attend schools for white children” so long as a majority of parents did not
object. (§ 58). Statutes of California, 1866, Chap. 342, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1865/1865_66.PDF#page=471.
38
Statutes of California, 1870, Chap. 556 §§ 56-57, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1869/1869_70.PDF#page=888.
39
James H. Deering, SUPPLEMENT TO THE CODES OF CALIFORNIA 107-108 (1893).
40
Id.
41
An Act to Amend the Provisions of the Political Code Relative to Public Schools, § 26, available at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/Statutes/1873/1873_74Code.PDF.
42
48 Cal. 36 (1874).
43
Theodore H. Hittell. Codes and Statutes of the State of California 103-104 (1877-1880).
44
66 Cal. 473 (1885).
45
38 Daily Alta California, March 5, 1885.
46
Chap 117, March 12, 1885.
47
For context, see David Brudnoy, Race and the San Francisco School Board Incident, 50 CAL. HIST. Q. 295
(1971); Chuman, supra note 1, chapter two.
48
Wysinger v. Cruikshank, 82 Cal. 588 (1890), confirmed that the race-neutral language of the 1880 amendment,
followed by discriminatory language in the 1885 amendment that did not include Black students, foreclosed districts
from sending Black students to segregated schools.
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enough to support exclusion. 49 The Board did not act in 1905, but in 1906 passed a resolution
directing school principals to send all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children to the “Oriental
School” that had been established near Chinatown, recently leveled by earthquake and far from
the homes of many Japanese children. 50 Various reasons, consistently recurring over time, were
advanced in the ensuing debate: Japanese immigrants could not assimilate, were not Christian,
might intermarry with whites, and were a security risk. 51

Japan had recently enjoyed notable military success against Russia, and an 1894 treaty
between Japan and the United States gave Japanese citizens rights equivalent to those granted to
the citizens of nations most favored by U.S. law. 52 The School Board’s action thus presented a
problem of diplomacy: British and German children were not placed in segregated schools, and
the most favored nation provision thus precluded the School Board’s action. President Theodore
Roosevelt, who ultimately mediated that conflict, condemned the school board’s action. “To shut
[the Japanese] out from the public schools is a wicked absurdity,” he told Congress. 53 His
Secretary of Labor, Victor Metcalf, submitted a report on conditions in San Francisco that found
that the Board’s resolution was influenced by the Exclusion League, which claimed 78,500

49

Johnson reports that it was recognized at the time that the term “Mongolian” could not be stretched to cover
Japanese immigrants. A proposed amendment to Section 1662 would have extended the prohibition to “Indian
children, Chinese children, Malay children, Corean children, Japanese children and all Mongolian children.”
Johnson, supra note 1, at 22.
50
Quoted in Brudnoy, supra note 47, at 297. For contemporaneous reaction and the distance of the Oriental School
from Japanese residences, see Johnson, supra note 1, at 25.
51
On assimilation, intermarriage, Christianity, and patriotism, see Johnson, supra note 1, at 26-30. On security risks,
see Buell, Agitation, supra note 1 at 633, and
52
The treaty is discussed in The Japanese School Question, 1 AM. J. INT’L LAW 150 (1907). The school board
argued that this MFN provision was limited to rights related to residence or travel, which did not include attendance
at public school.
53
Reprinted in Johnson, supra note 1, at 93.
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members, most of whom belonged to unions. 54 The exclusion league and union affiliates
organized a boycott of Japanese restaurants, which ended when Japanese restaurant owners paid
off the organizers. Metcalf found violence against Japanese persons was common, reporting 19
separate cases. 55 He told local police officials that, if they did not get the situation in hand, the
Federal government would intervene. 56 Southern legislators were appalled that the President
would challenge a school board’s power to segregate non-white children from whites. 57 The
1894 treaty provided a way to finesse the problem. Carefully noting that nothing compelled
California to establish public schools in the first place, Elihu Root wrote that the question was
not one of states’ rights to segregate but of the treaty power under the Constitution. 58
The school board incident was notable not only because it involved the President and
questions of the treaty power, but because there were fewer than 100 Japanese children then in
San Francisco schools, one-third of them citizens. 59 The incident also contributed to the
“Gentleman’s Agreement” between the United States and Japan, under which Japan agreed not
to issue passports for entry solely to Hawaii or the United States, except for family reunification,
and the United States agreed to enforce this effective prohibition. 60 Domestically, the
administration agreed to withdraw two lawsuits it had filed against the San Francisco School
Board, and the Board agreed to rescind its resolution. 61

54

Id.
Id. at 103-106.
56
Id. at 107.
57
Brudnoy, supra note 47, at 295, 305.
58
Elihu Root, The Real Questions Under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1
AM. J. INT’L LAW 273 (1907). As he put it, the treaty “leaves every state free to have public schools or not, as it
chooses, but it says to every state: `If you provide a system of education which includes alien children, you must not
exclude these particular alien children.’" Id. at 278.
59
Brudnoy, 50 CAL. HIST. Q. at 303. The number comes from the Metcalf report, reprinted in Johnson, supra note
1, at 96-97.
60
Daniels, Politics, supra note 1, at 43-44.
61
Buell, Agitation, supra note 1, at 627, 631. In one of the suits, the Federal Government argued that the relevant
statute could not provide a basis for excluding Japanese children because they were not Mongolian. Johnson, supra
note 1, at 47. Documents reflecting the agreement are reprinted in id. at 89-91.
55
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D
The agreement did away with the resolution but did not stop Japanese immigration.
Continuing immigration brought continued protests, including, in 1908, rumors that Japanese
warships were stationed near Hawaii, accusations by the mayor of Portland that Japanese spies
were procuring maps to the city, and stories run by the Hearst newspapers bearing titles such as
“Japan May Seize the Pacific Coast.” 62 Professed fears of Japanese invasion distinguished racial
measures targeting Japanese persons from earlier discrimination against Chinese persons. Japan
had modernized at an astonishing rate, defeated Russia in war, and seemed intent on becoming a
global power. 63 That had not been true of China in the late nineteenth century. Racial measures
against Chinese persons can be attributed to domestic paranoia over wages, intermarriage, and
white dominance. With respect to measures against the Japanese, paranoia over security can be
added to this list. 64 In 1909 Homer Lea, an adventurer with experience in China, wrote The Valor
of Ignorance, a novel predicting that Japan would invade the Philippines and then conquer the
West Coast. 65 The book might be considered no more than a cultural artifact of a particular time,
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had not Secretary of War Henry Stimson referenced it in his diary in February 1942, shortly
before he decided in favor of internment.

Discrimination extended to property ownership. Federal law in the early twentieth
century limited naturalization to “free white” persons, and in Ozawa v. United States, 66 the
Supreme Court held that a Japanese person resident in Hawaii but born in Japan was not such a
person within the meaning of the law. This Supreme Court ruling affirmed the trend of prior
cases, and California took advantage of this trend with two laws restricting Japanese ownership
of land. In his “wicked absurdity” message to Congress, Theodore Roosevelt had asked
Congress for legislation allowing Japanese immigrants to become naturalized citizens, but he did
not get it.
Such rulings provided support for California’s first “Alien Land Law,” passed in 1913. 67
That law prohibited alien persons ineligible for citizenship from owning or leasing land except to
the extent provided by treaty. 68 Land acquired in violation of the law escheated to the State. The
66
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treaty exception recognized that the United States and Japan had signed a treaty of Commerce
and Navigation in 1911. That treaty gave Japanese subjects the right to “carry on trade,
wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops
[and] . . . to lease land for residential and commercial purposes . . . .” 69 The law extended to
corporations a majority of whose stock was owned by persons ineligible for citizenship, and it
excluded land already owned by ineligible aliens and agricultural leases longer than three years.
The 1913 law thus effectively eliminated the right of Japanese persons to own agricultural land
or lease it for more than three years. 70 Reaction in Japan was strongly negative. 71 The law was
shepherded through both state and national politics by Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson,
who wrote with evident pride that “never again in California can the Japanese question be a
political question, except as we shall want it to be.” 72
Japanese immigration continued notwithstanding the Gentlemen’s Agreement, and World
War I produced labor shortages, so the law was not enforced rigorously before 1920. 73 With the
war ended, California’s governor, William D. Stephens, asked the State Board of Control to draft
a report describing conditions relating to Japanese, Chinese, and Hindu persons resident in
California. He forwarded the report, entitled California and the Oriental, 74 to Secretary of State
William Colby. Stephens’s cover letter urged Congressional action to control immigration and
summed up his view. He wrote that as of 1880 California’s problem was “a threatened
inundation of our white civilization” because of Chinese immigration. 75 Stephens thought
enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Act had substantially solved that problem, but that in the
meantime “we have been developing an even more serious problem by reason of the influx to our
shores of Japanese labor.” 76 He complained that by “unquestioned industry and application, and
by standards and methods that are widely separated from our occidental standards and methods,”
Japanese workers had come to control important agricultural industries: 77
The Japanese, by very reason of their use of economic standards impossible to our
white ideals—that is to say, the employment of their wives and their very children
in the arduous toil of the soil, are proving crushing competitors to our white rural
populations. . . . in many of the country schools of our state the spectacle is
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presented of having a few white children acquiring their education in classrooms
crowded with Japanese. 78
Stephens concluded that “the people of California only desire to retain the
commonwealth of California for its own people; they recognize the impossibility of that peaceproducing assimilability which comes only when races are so closely akin that intermarriage
within a generation or two obliterates original lines. The thought of such a relationship is
impossible to the people of California, just as the thought of intermarriage of whites and black
would be impossible to leaders of both races in the southern states . . .” 79 Senator Phelan echoed
these sentiments: “The Japanese . . . are impossible competitors, and drive the white settlers,
whose standards of living are different, from their farms.” 80 “We must preserve the soil for the
Caucasian race,” he concluded. 81
The report itself surveyed demographic data but also advanced two arguments that
echoed earlier concerns regarding security. Regarding Japanese fishermen, the report stated that
their familiarity with the “coast line, harbors and defenses” would “be extremely dangerous to us
and serviceable to an enemy if made available to such enemy during a period of war.” 82 The
report also noted that under Japanese law, everyone born of Japanese parents was a Japanese
citizen, and thus subject to military service in Japan. Even children born in America, and thus
U.S. citizens, “[owe their] first obligation of allegiance and military service to Japan.” 83 The
report cited only the Japanese law for this claim, phrased to invite a conclusion about subjective
loyalty when it in fact describes one implication of Japanese rather than U.S. law.
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The 1913 Alien Land Law had been sidestepped in some cases by vesting land title in
children born in the United States, and thus citizens, or having an attorney or other citizen act as
a trustee of a trust holding the land for the benefit of a minor. Corporations were also formed to
hold such land, with 51% of the voting stock being issued to an attorney (or employee of the
attorney) acting on behalf of the corporation. 84 Individual farmers could take successive threeyear leases on a parcel and farm collectively as a de facto partnership. 85 And the statute did not
prevent renewal of the permissible three-year lease of agricultural land, implying the possibility
of successive renewals that might mimic ownership. 86
In 1920, a strengthened version of the 1913 law was adopted by initiative. 87
Commenting on the 1920 law, in 1921 John S. Chambers, California’s State Controller and Chair
of the Japanese Exclusion League, wrote that “California has gone as far as she could go under
the federal and state constitutions and the American-Japanese treaty. If she could have gone
further she would have done so.” 88 He identified as California’s next goals the cessation of all
immigration from Japan (achieved in 1924) and amending the Constitution to provide that
“children born in this country of parents ineligible to citizenship themselves shall be ineligible to
citizenship.” 89 Like most racial commentary of the time on this topic, Chambers grounded his
position in the supposed impossibility of assimilation, and he grounded that premise in the
supposed impossibility of intermarriage. 90 He also cited Japanese economic ambition as grounds
for legal sanctions against them, noting “[t]here are fewer Japanese in California working for
white people than there are white people working for Japanese” and complaining: “At first they
are willing to work for wages, then for a portion of the crop, then under a lease and finally by
84
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hook or crook, if possible, they secure ownership.” 91 V.S. McClatchy, a former newspaper
publisher and leader of anti-Japanese sentiment at this time, echoed each point. 92
Also in 1920, James Phelan ran for re-election to the Senate on a whites-only platform.
He lost, but Phelan’s platform reflected the use of anti-Japanese propaganda as a political tool.
Carey McWilliams, a lawyer, journalist, and for a time Director of the Division of Immigration
and Housing within the California Department of Industrial Relations, noted that “the `peak’
years of anti-Japanese agitation” were “years in which Presidential elections were held:1908,
1912, 1916, and 1920.” 93 The rhetoric was hard to control. In 1920, for example, “a band of
several hundred white men, with the ‘apparent connivance of the police,’ rounded up fifty-eight
Japanese laborers in Turlock, `placed them on a train, and warned them never to return.’” 94

The 1920 law eliminated the three-year lease exception, precluded ineligible aliens from
acquiring stock in an entity authorized to own land (unless a treaty guaranteed that right),
required trustees to report to the State information that could ferret out evasion, established a
91
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presumption that land was subject to escheat if consideration for a transaction was paid by an
ineligible alien, and prohibited aliens ineligible to own land—including parents—from acting as
guardians of property held in the name of children. 95 A trio of cases in 1923 upheld the law, 96
although in other contexts at this time the Supreme Court defended freedom of contract. 97
Japanese land ownership decreased as the law tightened. 98
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In 1924, another Presidential election year, Congress barred immigration by persons ineligible to
become citizens. 99 As noted earlier, citizenship was limited to “free white” persons, so this law
effectively banned Japanese immigration.
During this period, it was claimed that persons of Japanese descent were monopolizing
the best agricultural land. 100 And, as shown below, after Pearl Harbor, Attorney General Earl
Warren suggested that the location of land owned or worked by persons of Japanese descent
posed an unacceptable risk of espionage. In truth, however, the pattern of agricultural land
occupation was determined in significant extent by the use of intensive farming techniques to
render productive land that previously was written off as marginal. 101

E
99

Pub. L. 68-139, 45 Stat. 153 (1924), available at
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/43/STATUTE-43-Pg153a.pdf.
100
California and the Oriental, supra note 74, at 8, 50. Writing in 1921, Chambers identified the problem as a risk
off continued acquisition, noting that some might wonder “why all this agitation over 100,000 Japanese in a total
California population of over 3,000,000, or the ownership or control by these people of half a million acres or so in a
state that has 99,617,280 acres, and of which area 28,828,951 acres are in farms.” Chambers, supra note 88, at 25.
He answered:
Watch the gopher at work. He starts to bore into a levee, and as he progresses he is joined by more
of his kind; then, in due time, the other side of the embankment is reached, and a little stream of
water passes through. As the dirt crumbles, a flow increases and unless promptly checked the bore
soon becomes a wide gap with the water rushing through and overflowing the land. That is the
flood that means loss, and perhaps eventual disaster.
Id.
101
McWilliams, supra note 1, at 79-80.

18

Governor Stephens’s 1922 invocation of Southern attitudes towards interracial marriages
of Black and White couples to justify Californians’ animosity to persons of Japanese descent 102
indicates that racist attitudes reinforced one another through the 1920s and beyond. During this
period the federal government sought to foster good relations with Japan while California
displayed overt hostility. In general, the federal government tried to persuade California to use a
lighter touch but did not seek to punish it for the stringent measures it took. 103 Carey
McWilliams made this point explicit:
Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Calvin
Coolidge were all forced to recognize a connection between the Oriental problem
on the Pacific Coast and the Negro problem in the Deep South. Since the federal
government had capitulated to the South on the Negro question, it found itself
powerless to cope with race bigotry on the Pacific Coast. Whenever the West
Coast racial creed was seriously challenged in Congress, or when the spokesmen
for this creed were proposing new aggressions, representatives from the Deep
South quickly rallied to their defense. 104
F
With immigration and land ownership addressed in the 1920s, the 1930s saw an increase
in concern over Japanese persons as security risks. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931,
establishing a compliant government for the area. Japan declared war on China in 1937, and
Japan allied with Germany in 1940. In between, angered by Japan’s aggression in China, the
U.S. terminated its 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan—the treaty whose
provisions created an exception in the Alien Land Laws. For its part, the press, particularly the
Hearst papers, kept alive some degree of anxiety over aggression from Japan.

102

California and the Oriental, supra note 1, at 15.
The lawsuits filed by the Roosevelt administration in connection with the School Board incident constitute the
brief exception that proves the rule.
104
McWilliams, Prejudice, supra note 1 at 12.
103

19

Anti-Japanese legislation in California tapered off, though, as noted above, anti-miscegenation
laws were extended to Filipino persons. Nisei children, citizens by birth, did not face the same
language barriers as their Isei parents and were able to participate in school and related activities
that helped them assimilate more fully in United States culture than their parents. 105
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Security concerns increased throughout the 1930s. Since the 1920s the FBI had
investigated Japanese persons whom the Bureau thought might be in league with organizations
the Bureau monitored, such as Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association. 106
Such investigation intensified in the 1930s, as the FBI feared that Japanese persons in America
might foment rebellion of non-white persons against white discrimination. 107 As the decade
progressed, the War Department worried that Japanese persons would foment racial discontent
among Black persons working in the defense industry, as a means of impeding U.S.
mobilization. 108
As early as 1936, President Roosevelt wrote a memorandum to the chief of naval
operations referring to the possible need for “concentration camps” to be used to contain both
alien and citizen Japanese persons in Hawaii “in the event of trouble.” 109 (Regarding
terminology, remember that in 1936, and for some time thereafter, writers using the phrase
“concentration camps” would not have then known of slave labor camps or death camps operated
by the Nazi regime.)
In 1939-40, the FBI began to compile a list of alien persons it thought might be security
risks, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (“ONI”) began to keep lists of groups it considered
potentially subversive, membership in which could be used as a proxy to label a person a
security risk. 110 The Justice Department’s Special Defense Unit established a three-tier
designation of risk levels, with A being the greatest risk and C the least. For example,
membership in the German-American Bund or the American National Socialist League, both
Nazi organizations, placed a German alien in category A. 111 The ONI compiled a similar list for
Japanese persons. Organizations listed as reflecting high security risk included the Black Dragon
Society, which one scholar described as “a patriotic, ultra-right wing extremist group,” 112 but
also the Japanese-American Theater Association, the Japanese-American Student Conference,
the Buddhist Federation, and the Japanese Historical Society. 113
In March 1941, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle of the ONI organized a break-in
at the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles. Aided by local police, the FBI, and a safe cracker
borrowed from prison, Ringle and his men copied documents in the consulate that disclosed the
identities of members of a Japanese spy ring. The leader was arrested and deported. 114 In June
1941, Itaru Tachibana, a language officer with the Imperial Japanese Navy was arrested in Los
Angeles for spying. He was accused of procuring Naval reports through a white man named Al
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Blake, whom he paid. 115 In November 1941, the FBI conducted raids on the Los Angeles
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the Central Japanese Association. 116
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ran an informal intelligence network through a
journalist named John Franklin Carter. 117 Carter deputed Curtis B. Munson, a wealthy
businessman, to tour the West Coast and report back on security risks. On November 7, 1941,
Carter sent Roosevelt Munson’s report. Munson concluded that in the event of war “[t]here will
be no armed uprising of Japanese,” though there would be sabotage by agents already infiltrated
into the U.S. He estimated that in each naval district (there were three) about 250-300 suspects
were under surveillance, of whom 50-60 in each district were considered serious risks. Munson
referenced a captain of Naval Intelligence who had intercepted information sent from the U.S. to
Japan and found most of it worthless. He concluded:
For the most part local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope
that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible
mobs. We do not believe that they would be at least any more disloyal than any
other racial group in the United States with whom we went to war. 118
By the end of November 1941, U.S. intelligence warned of imminent hostilities with
Japan. A November 27, 1941, message from the Chief of Naval Operations began: “This
dispatch is to be considered a war warning.” On December 5, 1941, the FBI ordered an office in
Juneau, Alaska to coordinate “the immediate apprehension of Japanese aliens in your district
who have been recommended for custodial detention.” 119
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II

Japan’s December 7 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor killed over 2,400 Americans and
destroyed numerous vessels and planes. On December 7, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was
president. He was a lawyer by training, and former Deputy Secretary of the Navy. His family
money came from his mother, whose father was a merchant with extensive dealings with
China. 120 Japan had been at war with China since 1937.
The War Department—Civilian Officials
Roosevelt’s Secretary of War was Henry Stimson. Born in 1867, Stimson was a
graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School and was part of an elite New York law firm before
becoming the United States Attorney in New York. A Republican, Stimson was Secretary of the
War under President Taft and Secretary of State under President Hoover. He was a proponent of
the Stimson Doctrine, which held that nations should not be allowed to retain territory gained by
aggressive action, a doctrine that refused to acknowledge Japan’s dominance over Manchuria.
One of Stimson’s deputies was John J. McCloy. Born in 1895, he attended Harvard Law
School, pausing his legal studies to fight in World War I as aide de camp to Brigadier Gen. Guy
H. Preston. McCloy saw limited service at the front as an artillery officer. He returned to
practice law in New York. Among his cases was representation of Bethlehem Steel, which
sought damages from Germany for sabotage resulting in a massive explosion at a warehouse near
the Statue of Liberty. McCloy helped show that the explosion was caused by German agents. In
1941, Stimson made McCloy an assistant secretary of war. America had broken the code the
Japanese used for military communications; McCloy was one of a very few officials cleared to
read the decryptions, called “Magic.” 121 In testimony in the 1980s, McCloy testified that before
December 7 the Magic decryptions revealed that Japan had “a subversive agency” operating on
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the West Coast. 122 Among the persons involved in the internment decision, it appears that only
Roosevelt, Stimson, and McCloy had access to these decryptions.
The Justice Department
Roosevelt’s Attorney General was Francis Biddle. Born in Paris in 1886, Biddle
graduated from Harvard Law School, was private secretary to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., and was a former Chair of the National Labor Relations Board. He was a judge on the Third
Circuit from 1939-1940 and Solicitor General 1940-1941. He was appointed Attorney General
on September 5, 1941.
Charles Fahy was Solicitor General of the United States from November 1941 through
1945. He was a Navy pilot in World War I, receiving the Navy Cross. He was General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board from 1935-1940. When appointed Solicitor General he
had already argued 18 cases before the Supreme Court; his record was 16-2. In 1945, General
Eisenhower asked Fahy to become director of the legal division of the U.S. administration in
occupied Germany.
James Rowe was an Assistant Attorney General. Like Biddle, he was a Harvard Law
School graduate and a former secretary to Justice Holmes. Rowe worked in various New Deal
legal positions and, in 1939, became an assistant to President Roosevelt. He became Assistant
Attorney General in 1941. He was on familiar terms with Roosevelt’s staff, and attempted to
draw the president’s attention to the exclusion issue. (Rowe’s oral history interview on these
topics is here.)
Herbert Wechsler was Assistant Attorney General for the War Division of the
Department of Justice (not to be confused with lawyers working for the War Department itself).
Wechsler was a renowned law professor, instrumental in the drafting of the Model Penal Code,
and later represented the New York Times in the Supreme Court argument that produced New
York Times v. Sullivan.
Edward Ennis was the head of the Alien Enemy Control Unit at the Department of
Justice. He graduated from Columbia Law School in 1932, worked as an assistant United States
Attorney and then in the Solicitor General’s office in the Justice Department. Ennis went back to
New York to head the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s office, but he returned to
Washington in July 1941 when Biddle asked him to become the general counsel of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Ennis also worked with the Special Defense Unit,
which had been established in 1939 to plan for the screening of enemy aliens in the event of war.
Ennis eventually ran the Alien Enemy Control Unit within the Justice Department, which dealt
with persons detained because they were suspected of being a security risk. 123 (Ennis’s oral
history interview on these topics is here.)
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J. Edgar Hoover was director of the FBI, which was charged with compiling a list of
suspicious “enemy aliens”—persons who were not U.S. citizens and whose ancestry traced to a
country at war with the U.S.
The Army and Navy
Lieutenant General John DeWitt was commander of the Western Defense Command
and of the Fourth Army. 124 DeWitt had served in the field in the Spanish-American War, and
thereafter had focused on logistics and supply. He served four tours of duty in the Philippines,
was commandant of the Army War College, and took up his post in San Francisco in 1939. 125
Alone among the persons discussed in this note, he was not a lawyer.
Major General Allen W. Gullion was the Provost Marshal General of the Army,
responsible for law enforcement within the Army and, during this period, control of enemy
aliens. He was a graduate of the West Point and the University of Kentucky College of Law. He
began work as a military lawyer in 1917 and was named Judge Advocate General in 1937. He
became Provost Marshal General in August 1941.
Col. Karl Bendetsen was an assistant to Gen. Gullion when the latter was Judge
Advocate General. Bendetsen was placed in charge of the Aliens Division of the Provost
Marshal General’s office. He graduated from Stanford Law School. Other than Earl Warren, he
was the only person discussed in this note to have grown up on the West Coast—in Aberdeen,
Washington. He served as a liaison between Gullion, DeWitt, and McCloy. 126
California Officials
Earl Warren was the Attorney General of California. A graduate of U.C. Berkeley, he
had been the District Attorney for Alameda County. In 1942 he was elected Governor of
California. In 1948 he was unsuccessful as a candidate for Vice President. He became Chief
Justice of the United States in 1953.
A
A 1941 agreement between the Justice and War Departments gave the Justice Department
responsibility within the continental United States for alien persons descended from countries
with whom the United States might go to war. The Justice Department (FBI) would apprehend
suspicious persons; the Army agreed to detain them. 127
On the evening of December 7, the president authorized the FBI to arrest persons
identified as subversive. Presidential proclamations dated December 7 and 8 authorized the
detention of alien Japanese, German, and Italian persons deemed suspicious, authorized the
Army to assist the FBI in rounding up such persons, and authorized the exclusion of enemy
aliens “from any locality in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found to constitute a
danger to the public peace and safety of the United States.” 128 The proclamations also authorized
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the confiscation of items such as shortwave radios, cameras, or guns. The Attorney General was
responsible for such activity on the West Coast. 129 On December 8, the United States declared
war on Japan. By December 9, the FBI, with the cooperation of the army, had taken into custody
over 1,000 Japanese persons and smaller numbers of German and Italian persons. On December
11, Italy and Germany declared war on the United States, which reciprocated that day. Between
December 17 and 23, Japanese submarines sank two tankers and one freighter off the West
Coast. 130
Initial reactions, public and private, did not call for mass exclusion of Japanese
persons. 131 In remarks dated December 8, 1941, Representative Coffee of Washington wrote,
“[a]s one who has lived as a neighbor to Japanese-Americans, I have found these people, on the
whole, to be law abiding, industrious, and unobtrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our Bill of
Rights by mistreating these folks.” 132 The Justice Department issued a press release on
December 10, stating “[a]t no time will the government engage in wholesale condemnation of
any alien group.” 133
On December 15, on his return from inspecting Pearl Harbor, Navy Secretary Henry
Knox asserted that the attack succeeded because of “fifth-column work,” implying subversion by
Japanese in Hawaii. 134 His comments were reported widely. 135 On December 16, 1941, Munson
wrote a second report, which Carter summarized for Roosevelt. Also on that date, Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. General Walter C. Short, the senior officers in Hawaii of the Navy
and Army, respectively, were removed from their posts. 136 Attorney General Francis Biddle’s
notes of a December 19, 1941, cabinet meeting stated, “Knox told me, which was not what
Hoover had thought, that there was a great deal of very active Fifth Column work going on both
from the shores and from the sampans.” 137
On December 19, General DeWitt recommended to Army GHQ 138 that all enemy aliens
be removed from coastal California. 139 This request did not distinguish Japanese from German
or Italian aliens. On December 22, DeWitt asked the War Department to press the Justice
Department to issue regulations implementing President Roosevelt’s December 7 and 8
proclamations. 140 As late as December 26, 1941, Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, in charges of defense
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measures on the West Coast, stated in a telephone conversation with Major General Allen W.
Gullion, Provost Marshall of the Army:
[I]f we go ahead and arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we
are going to have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the
loyal Japanese from disloyal . . . . I’d rather go along the way we are now . . .
rather than attempt any such wholesale internment . . . . An American citizen,
after all, is an American Citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we
can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary. 141
DeWitt did, however, want to expedite search and seizure for the items specified in the
proclamations and he thought the Attorney General was moving too slowly to promulgate
regulations allowing such activity. 142 On December 30, the Attorney General authorized
issuance of search warrants based on reasonable cause (attested by the FBI) to believe that the
house contained contraband, as well as warrants for the arrest of persons living in the house. 143
For its part, in December 1942 the FBI (Director Hoover) believed the Army was overreacting
and that mass raids might alienate otherwise loyal persons. 144
On January 4-5, Rowe met with Bendetsen and DeWitt in San Francisco. Based on
Gullion’s prior suggestion, DeWitt pressed for the power to search houses and cars of enemy
aliens without cause and the power to exclude enemy aliens from areas he deemed strategic. 145
The latter demand was consistent with the President’s proclamation, and Biddle largely
agreed. 146 He also agreed to treat a representation that an enemy alien resided in a house as
enough to show probable cause. 147 The Justice Department did not agree to conduct warrantless
searches, or mass searches not based on some showing of cause. Nevertheless, the FBI began to
search, for example, all fishermen (400) on Terminal Island near Los Angeles, looking for
shortwave radios. 148 Sometime before January 20, Rowe told Roger Baldwin, head of the
American Civil Liberties Union, that DeWitt was proposing to exclude all Japanese persons from
the coastal area. 149
On January 21, General DeWitt proposed exclusion zones divided into two categories.
Enemy aliens would be excluded from all “Category A” zones, of which he identified 86.
Enemy aliens would be permitted in eight “Category B” zones only with a permit. In California,
over 7,000 enemy aliens would be excluded from Category A zones, only 40% of which would
have been Japanese persons; the majority would have been Italian. 150 Secretary of War Stimson
forwarded the recommendation to Attorney General Biddle along with a cover letter, drafted by
the Provost Marshal General’s Office, stating that General DeWitt expressed great concern over
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ship-to-shore radio communications that he believed were coordinated by enemy aliens. The
letter asserted that “not a single ship has sailed from Pacific ports without being subsequently
attacked.” 151 These statements were later shown to be incorrect.
B
Meanwhile, in early January 1942, California politicians began to lobby for exclusion of
all Japanese persons. In typical California fashion, an actor with political interests was an early
advocate. On January 6, 1942, Leo Carrillo wrote to Congressman Leland Ford. “My Dear
Leland,” he wrote:
Why not urge legislation to compel all Japanese truck farmers who control nearly
every vital foot of our California coast line with their vegetable acreage to retire
inland at a safe distance from the California coast which has been declared a
combat zone. Mexico has done this as a precaution and to we Californians that
seems like good sense. Why wait until they pull something before we act. I
travel every week through a hundred miles of Japanese shacks on the way to my
ranch and it seems that every farm house is located on some strategic elevated
point. Lets get them off the Coast and into the interior. 152
Congressman Ford forwarded this telegram to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and, on
January 16, 1942, to Hoover. In the latter letter Ford wrote that “I know that there will be some
complications in connection with a matter like this, particularly where there are many native
born Japanese, who are citizens.” Nevertheless, he argued:
if an American born Japanese, who is a citizen, is really patriotic and wishes to
make his contribution to the safety and welfare of this country, right here is his
opportunity to do so, namely, by permitting himself to be placed in a
concentration camp, he would be making his sacrifice and he should be willing to
do it if he is patriotic and working for us. As against his sacrifice, millions of
other native born citizens are willing to lay down their lives, which is a far greater
sacrifice, of course, than being placed in a concentration camp. 153
Ford eventually sent seven similar communications, including to Attorney General Biddle and
Secretary of War Stimson. 154 Biddle replied that citizens could not be interned unless the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended; Stimson replied that the prospect of internment of over 100,000
persons presented “complex considerations,” but indicated that the Army would be willing to
provide internment facilities to the extent necessary. 155
A commission to investigate Pearl Harbor, headed by Owen Roberts, reported on January
25, 1942. The report did not repeat the “fifth column” accusation but, in a list of factors that
included Army failure to operate an aircraft warning system (radar) and Navy failure to fly longrange reconnaissance missions, the report did state that prior to December 7 there were Japanese
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spies on Oahu. 156 The report stated that Japanese espionage was centered in the Japanese
consulate on Honolulu. 157 The Roberts report found Kimmel and Short guilty of dereliction of
duty, but absolved those above and below them in the chain of command. When Justice Roberts
returned to Washington D.C. he conveyed his personal doubts about the loyalty of ethnic
Japanese persons on Oahu to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. 158 The Roberts report’s reference
to Japanese spies was accurate, but the report did not blame longtime residents, much less
citizens. It did not state that the spies were of Japanese ancestry, rather than in the pay of Japan
(though the reference to the consulate points in that direction).
Support for widespread Japanese exclusion increased after the Roberts report was
released. 159 On January 27, Los Angeles County fired all its workers of Japanese descent. A
January 29 editorial in Hearst’s San Francisco Examiner stated:
The only Japanese apprehended have been the ones the FBI actually had
something on. The rest of them, so help me, are free as birds. There isn’t an
airport in California that isn’t flanked by Japanese farms. . . . I am for immediate
removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I
don’t mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd ‘em up, pack ‘em off and give
‘em the inside room in the badlands. Let ‘em be pinched, hurt, hungry, and dead
up against it. . . . Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them. 160
As January 1942 stretched into February, persons of Japanese descent were fired from public and
private employment and were subject to economic and social boycotts. 161
The Chief of Naval Operations had asked Ringle to report recommendations on what
should be done with Japanese persons on the West Coast. Ringle issued a report on January 26,
1942. He concluded that the large majority of aliens (non-citizens) were at least passively loyal
to the United States, and the number of persons who might act as saboteurs or agents was about
300. Ringle opined that these persons were known to the FBI or ONI and either were already
detained or could be detained. Ringle thought Kibei—Japanese persons born in the United
States, and thus citizens, but who had been educated in Japan and then returned—posed a special
risk and he recommended that they be detained. He estimated that there were about 600-700 such
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persons in Los Angeles, and perhaps an equivalent number in the rest of Southern California.
Ringle agreed with Munson, concluding:
[T]he entire “Japanese Problem” has been magnified out of its true proportion,
largely because of the physical characteristics of the people; that it is no more
serious that the problems of the German, Italian, and Communistic portions of the
United States population, and, finally that it should be handled on the basis of the
individual, regardless of citizenship, and not on a racial basis. 162
Ringle argued that “the Nisei could be accorded a place in the national war effort without
risk or danger and that such a step would go farther than anything else towards cementing their
loyalty to the United States.” 163 He further noted “many of the persons and groups agitating
anti-Japanese sentiment against the Issei and Nisei have done so for some time from ulterior
motives,” such as eliminating competition. 164 He opposed legislation introduced by Los Angeles
representative Ford “providing for the removal and interment in concentration camps of all
citizens and residents of Japanese extraction . . . .” 165 Ringle flew to San Francisco twice to meet
with Bendetsen, with a view to conveying his findings, but he was not able to obtain such a
meeting. 166 In late January, California political leaders, including Governor Culbert Olsen and
Attorney General Earl Warren, contacted DeWitt and Bendetsen, advocating exclusion of both
aliens and citizens of Japanese descent. DeWitt felt that “the best people of California” favored
exclusion. 167
C
On February 2, 1942, California Attorney General Earl Warren convened a Conference of
Sheriffs and District Attorneys from throughout the state. Its purpose was to discuss using the
Alien Land Law to displace Japanese persons from agricultural land near what might be
considered strategic locations, such as airports. According to Assistant Attorney General Warren
Olney, Warren originally intended to invite only sheriffs and district attorneys “of those few
counties where we thought it was likely that there was a provable case. But at the suggestion of
the army and navy and other federal authorities, he expanded the list of invitees to include the
district attorneys and sheriffs from all counties where the federal government felt there was a
security problem.” 168
At the meeting Warren argued that California was at risk of “fifth column activities” and
“sabotage,” 169 a point he supported thus:
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It seems to me that it is quite significant that in this great state of ours we have
had no fifth column activities and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to me
as though it is a studied effort not to have any until the zero hour arrives. 170
More plainly, the future Chief Justice of the United States insisted that the absence of sabotage
proved the risk of sabotage. Together with Congressman Ford’s theory that truly loyal Japanese
citizens would agree to be interned, this argument persisted in debates over internment.
Various district attorneys pointed out shortcomings in the use of the Alien Land Law as a
security measure—judicial proceedings would take time, while removal was an immediate
concern, for example, and Japanese citizen children had both the right to own land and the right
for an alien parent to act as their guardian. 171 District Attorney Whelan of San Diego County
suggested that, in view of the war, German and Italian aliens were ineligible for citizenship as
well as Japanese persons. Warren replied that the “purpose of the Act was to limit ownership of
land to the White race,” 172 and that use against German or Italian aliens would be inconsistent
with that purpose. He also commented that an enforcement effort could produce results even
without convictions, in the form of leases that would not be renewed: “We might not be able to
put down on paper the exact results of our activity, but it will result in a lot of land going back
into white ownership, at least it will to white use.” 173
Warren’s meeting produced consensus that California officials would advocate that the
Army and federal government take the lead on exclusion or confer on California officials the
power to do so. One exchange between Warren and L.A. District Attorney Dockweiler is
illustrative:
[Warren] [Y]ou have about two or three thousand of them down on Terminal
Island, right up against a naval establishment there, an air field . . . You wouldn’t
want to go down there and give those three thousand Japs a bums-rush off that
place. . . .
[Dockweiler] I would if General DeWitt would give me a letter to do it.
[Warren] Oh yes, I will say. Of course that is true. 174
Repeating a theme of maneuvering to place or avoid responsibility that ran through all
discussions on the topic, Dockweiler stated “[m]y original idea was not to stop on the Alien Land
Law to get them off, but to hammer at the authorities who have the powers to get them off the
land and away from the coast. . . . And if they don’t do it, then the people will know who is
170
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responsible.” 175 Dockweiler also argued that citizens of Japanese descent—Nisei—were a
greater risk than the older alien population because the citizens were younger. 176 For his part,
Warren urged attendees to move past the weaknesses of the Alien Land Law by conjuring a
hypothetical in which “there were some violations of the Alien Land Law in the neighborhood of
some vital facility of the community” and “fifth column activities were engaged in and the whole
defense program fell down” or “[m]aybe some people would get killed, and then they would
have an investigation in California like the one over in Pearl Harbor and say . . . “[t]hose Japs
were living right up there in violation of the law, right under those big power lines, when the
zero hour struck . . . . “ 177 He concluded, in a room filled partly with elected officials, “I
wouldn’t want to have that either on my conscience or on my record.” 178
From this discussion Warren conceived the idea of mapping Japanese land ownership.
He conjectured that “if we really surveyed our counties accurately with respect to the Japanese
ownerships and also with relation to our critical points, that we would find some things that
would just dumbfound us.” 179 He thought when the mapping was done and the facts were “made
known to the Military and Naval authorities, [those facts] might bring about something very,
very substantial in the State.” 180 Warren volunteered to act as intermediary, providing local
officials with locations the military deemed critical. 181 Local officials drew up the maps and sent
them to Sacramento. One of the resulting maps for San Diego county is reprinted below. Warren
also volunteered to assist district attorneys in pursuing alien land law cases: “I will prepare the
necessary forms of complaints in escheat and indictment for violation of this Act, and any other
thing that you think would be of interest to you.” 182
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In general, in the latter part of January 1942 through February 1942, political forces in
California hostile to the interests of Japanese persons mobilized to advocate for exclusion. The
consequences for Japanese persons were severe. On January 26, 1942 Lieutenant Commander
Ringle recited a list of challenges as of that date:
[L]oss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation by and among
Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by Filipinos and other racial
groups, denial of relief funds to desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses
for markets, produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharge
from jobs by the wholesale, unnecessarily harsh restrictions on travel, including
discriminatory regulations against all Nisei preventing them from engaging in
commercial fishing . . . 183
D
While Warren and California law enforcers were mapping Japanese residents, the debates
in Washington D.C. drew to a close. The War Department and Justice Department found it hard
to agree on the contours of zones of exclusion, which had been agreed to in principle on January
4-5. DeWitt’s January 21 zones for California were modest, as noted above. They implied
exclusion of about 7,000 persons, 40% of whom were Japanese. His recommended zones of
exclusion for Oregon and Washington included all of Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma. 184 This
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recommendation implied exclusion of an additional 10,700 enemy aliens; as had been the case in
California, about 40% of that population was Japanese. 185
On February 1, 1942, Gullion, Bendetsen, and McCloy from the Army met with Hoover,
Rowe, Ennis, and Biddle from the Justice Department to discuss exclusion. The Justice
representatives proposed a joint statement stating that the War and Justice Departments agreed
that “the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens
of the Japanese race.” Gullion questioned the statement, and in a later conversation DeWitt
concurred: “I wouldn’t agree to that.” DeWitt affirmed his view that both aliens and citizens
needed to be excluded from restricted areas. Bendetsen then related his view of the Justice
Department’s position: “They say that if it comes to pass, if we recommend and it is determined
that there should be a movement or evacuation of citizens, they say hands off, that it is the
Army’s job . . . .” DeWitt replied: “what they are trying to do, it looks to me just off the bat,
without thinking it over, they are trying to cover themselves and lull the population into a false
sense of security.” The conversation continued:
General DeWitt:

I tell you Bendetsen, I haven’t gone into the details of it,
but Hell, it would be no job as far as the evacuation was
concerned to move 100,000 people.

Major Bendetsen:

Put them on trains and move them to specified points.

General DeWitt:

We could to it in job lots, you see. We could take 4000 or
5000 a day, or something like that.

On February 4, 1942, Gullion spoke to General Mark Clark, who was to meet with
Congress regarding the situation. 186 In this account, Gullion attributed to McCloy a comment
McCloy supposedly made to Biddle:
[Y]ou are putting a wall street lawyer in a helluva box, but if it a question of
safety of the country, the Constitution of the United States, why the Constitution
is just a scrap of paper to me. That is what McCloy said. But they are just a little
afraid DeWitt hasn't enough grounds to justify any movements of that kind. 187
During the call, Gullion told Clark that exclusion of only alien persons “doesn’t touch
citizens at all and personally I don’t think that is going to cure the situation much.” Bendetsen
echoed this sentiment in a memorandum to Gullion on the same day. Bendetsen echoed an
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argument advanced at Warren’s February 1 meeting of law enforcers: Second-generation
citizens—Nisei—were more dangerous than their immigrant parents:
The average age of the alien Japanese is upwards of sixty years. A great majority
of the males are old and ill. The Nisei or second generation (citizen) Japanese, has
an average age of 30 years. Most of these have been indoctrinated with the filial
piety which characterizes that race. Their affections, if any, for the United States
will not be stimulated by the wholesale removal of their parents from their several
homes. On the contrary, it would be a natural and only human reaction if, as it is
to be expected, the Nisei were incensed by such action.
Bendetsen wrote that evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent plus alien Italians and
Germans deemed dangerous
has the widest acceptance among the Congressional Delegations and other Pacific
Coast Officials. It is undoubtedly the safest course to follow, that is to say as you
cannot distinguish or penetrate the Oriental thinking and as you cannot tell which
ones are loyal and which ones are not and it is, therefore, the easiest course (aside
from the mechanical problem involved) to remove them all from the West Coast
and place them the Zone of Interior in uninhabited areas where they can do no
harm under guard. . . . However, no one has justified fully the sheer military
necessity for such action.
Finally, also on February 4, General DeWitt indicated that he might need to add Los
Angeles and San Diego to his exclusion list. By February 12, he had added those cities and most
of the San Francisco Bay Area, creating a list that implied exclusion of 89,000 enemy aliens, but
only 25,000 of whom would be Japanese. 188 On February 10, Bendetsen wrote DeWitt a
memorandum summarizing exclusion-related proposals. Bendetsen wrote that Stimson probably
would accept a recommendation for exclusion from large zones, including the cities of San
Diego and Los Angeles, but probably would not accept a recommendation for “the entire
evacuation of the coastal strip.” The official Army history notes that, as late as February 12,
DeWitt himself had not proposed exclusion of any citizens, 189 though the 100,000-person figure
mentioned in his February 1 recorded comments contemplated such action.
At Justice, Biddle continued to maintain that the Justice Department would not detain or
exclude citizens, but he also continued not to insist that such an action would be unconstitutional
if taken by the War Department and the Army. He instead took the view that any such action
would have to be undertaken by the War Department on the basis of military necessity. 190 As a
practical matter, as the scale of exclusion increased the Justice Department became less able to
implement it. 191 Assembling and removing tens of thousands of persons was a military job.
Legislators from Western states lobbied for the same end. 192 Representative Ford
“phoned the Attorney General’s office and told them to stop fucking around. I gave them twenty
188
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four hours notice that unless they would issue a mass evacuation notice I would drag the whole
matter out on the floor of the House and of the Senate and give the bastards everything we could
with both barrels.” 193 As pressure for exclusion built on the West Coast, Stimson wrote in his
diary for February 10:
The second generation [citizen] Japanese can only be evacuated either as part of a
total evacuation, giving access to the areas only by permits, or by frankly trying to
put them out on the ground that their racial characteristics are such that we cannot
understand or trust even the citizen Japanese. The latter is the fact but I am afraid
it will make a tremendous hole in our constitutional system to apply it. It is a
terrific problem, particularly as I think it is quite within the bounds of possibility
that if the Japanese should get naval dominance in the Pacific they would try an
invasion of this country; and if they did we would have a tough job meeting them.
. . . Many times during recent months I have recalled meeting Homer Lea when I
was Secretary of War under Mr. Taft. He [Lea] was a little humpback man who
wrote a book on the Japanese peril entitled "The Valor of Ignorance". In those
days the book seemed fantastic. Now the things which he prophesied seem quite
possible. 194
On February 11, Stimson attempted to see Roosevelt to obtain a decision about exclusion.
Roosevelt was too busy to see him, but in a phone call Roosevelt told Stimson “to go ahead on
the line that I had myself thought the best.” 195 As the February 10 entry notes, Stimson at this
time apparently was considering whether a system using passes would work. On February 11,
Warren and Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron visited DeWitt at the Presidio. According to
Bowron, they both advocated exclusion run by the military. 196
On February 12, renowned newspaper columnist Walter Lippman advocated removal of
both Japanese aliens and citizens; he had been in touch with Warren and was familiar with his
views. 197 On February 13, West Coast members of Congress wrote Roosevelt urging “the
immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike,
whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from
all strategic areas.” Those were defined as “military installations, war industries, transportation
and other essential facilities” and areas adjacent to such places. 198 A syndicated cartoon was also
published on February 13:
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On February 13, Bendetsen wrote a recommendation under DeWitt’s name, which
Bendetsen delivered to Stimson on February 16. 199 It sought the power to exclude any persons
DeWitt deemed security risks, citizen or not. It stated in part:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by
migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third
generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States
citizenship, have become “Americanized,” the racial strains are undiluted. To
conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese
soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects . . . . It, therefore,
follows that along the vital Pacific Cost over 112,000 potential enemies, of
Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are
organized and ready for concreted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact
that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication
that such action will be taken. 200
The argument in the last sentence repeats the argument Warren advanced at his February 2
meeting of California law enforcement officials.
On February 17, Stimson, McCloy, Bendetsen, and Gullion met with General Mark
Clark, who was attached to the office of Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff.
Clark argued that mass exclusion would use too many troops that could be better used elsewhere.
Stimson decided that DeWitt would get the authority he sought but would not get additional
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troops. 201 That same day Biddle sent Roosevelt a memorandum opposing mass exclusion. He
wrote:
For several weeks there have been increasing demands for evacuation of all
Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, from the West Coast states. A great many of
the West Coast people distrust the Japanese, various special interests would
welcome their removal from good farm land and the elimination of their
competition . . . . My last advice from the War Department is that there is no
evidence of imminent attack and from the F.B.I. that there is no evidence of
planned sabotage. 202
Biddle stated that he had designated every zone of exclusion the War Department had sought,
and he stressed the practical problems with mass exclusion. He did not, however, tell the
President that exclusion of Japanese persons on racial grounds would be unconstitutional.
On the evening of February 17, Stimson, McCloy, Bendetsen, Biddle, Rowe, and Ennis
met at Biddle’s house to resolve the issue. The War Department had decided in favor of mass
exclusion already, and Biddle did not oppose. 203 He later wrote that Roosevelt had told him the
issue was one of military judgment, and Biddle thought he should not oppose exclusion any
further. 204 In his oral history comments, Rowe summarized the power dynamics of the meeting:
The last meeting we had was with Stimson, Patterson and McCloy, and Biddle,
Ennis, and myself. Stimson, you've got to remember, was a great man, and he
created by his mere presence the atmosphere of the great old man who had come
back once again to help his country. This affected Biddle strongly. I think Biddle
makes this point in his own memoirs. He did defer to Stimson, as most of us did.
But Ed Ennis went right after the great Stimson that morning. It was the last of the
business, and I remember, you know, thinking "Fine, Ed, argue with Stimson."
Stimson looked down his nose and said, "Mr. Ennis, we've just got to assume in
this room that we're all men of goodwill." 205
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which instructed the
War Department to designate military areas in which “the right of any person to enter, remain in,
or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military
Commander may impose in his discretion.” 206 On March 21, 1942, President Roosevelt signed
Public Law 503, which specified criminal penalties for violation of an order issued pursuant to
EO 9066.
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E
EO 9066 did not cover Hawaii, which was placed under martial law on December 7,
1941 and remained under martial law until 1944. There were no legal barriers to the Army
handling the Japanese population as it wished. But the Japanese population in Hawaii was a
greater percentage of the total population than was true in California, Japanese workers did many
vital jobs for which there were no obvious replacements, and pressure for evacuation came from
outside the Army rather than from within. 207 After investigation, the Army concluded that there
had been no sabotage committed by alien or citizen Japanese persons during or after the Pearl
Harbor attack. 208
As a result, the only Japanese persons excluded from Hawaii were those deemed
suspicious prior the attack. They were arrested immediately, as were such persons on the West
Coast. But though the War Department pressed repeatedly for internment of all persons of
Japanese descent, the commanding general in Hawaii, Lt. General Delos Carleton Emmons,
opposed general incarceration. He argued that Japanese workers were necessary to the war effort
and that the military could not spare personnel to guard detention camps in Hawaii. Relocation
to the mainland presented political problems because Japanese persons on the West Coast were
already being incarcerated in assembly camps as a prelude to relocation away from the coast. He
also consistently disagreed with claims that Japanese persons in Hawaii presented a general
security risk. Hawaii never attempted to incarcerate all persons of Japanese descent. By the end
of the war, approximately 1,875 Issei and Nisei, out of a population estimated at over 100,000,
were transported from Hawaii to internment camps on the mainland. 209
F
Pursuant to EO 9066, General DeWitt issued a series of proclamations and exclusion
orders. For a brief period of time, beginning in early March and ending on March 27, DeWitt
issued orders excluding persons of Japanese descent from certain areas, including all of the
Western half of California, but these early orders contemplated voluntary compliance. Persons
subject to them could not stay in the excluded area but were not subject to further compulsion;
they could move anywhere outside the excluded area. In California, about 4,000 persons of
Japanese descent moved East from the exclusion zone (Military Area No. 1) into Eastern
California (Military Area Number Two). In June 1942, however, DeWitt extended exclusion to
Area Two as well. After their first move, these persons who had voluntarily complied with the
first order were sent to internment camps as well. 210
As the 4,000 person figure suggests, many excluded persons had no connections outside
the exclusion zones, and persons living adjacent to those zones—in essence Eastern California,
border states such as Nevada and Arizona, and adjacent states including Utah—opposed
immigration of excluded persons. 211 Carey McWilliams reported that businesses to the east of
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coastal California began posting signs such as: “This restaurant poisons both rats and Japs,” and,
in a barbershop, “Japs Shaved: Not Responsible for Accidents.” 212 The Governor of Nevada
wrote DeWitt to say “I do not desire that Nevada become a dumping ground for enemy aliens . . .
.” He was willing to accept “concentration camps as well as . . . those who might be allowed to
farm or do such other things as they could do in helping out.” (Emphasis in original.)
Meanwhile, the Governor of Utah favored: (i) having the federal government assume all
responsibility for “handling the Jap problem” or giving the states enough money to “do the job”;
(ii) excluded persons “should not only be self-supporting but should contribute to defense
production”; (iii) states should decide on the work excluded persons should do; (iv) states should
supervise that work using federal funding; (v) “Evacuees needed immediately for agricultural
work, if production is not to suffer”; and (vi) sale of land or long-term leases to excluded persons
should be prevented, and excluded persons “should return to former residence after emergency.”
On March 27, DeWitt issued Public Proclamation Number 4. It forbade excluded persons
from leaving the exclusion zones. They could neither stay nor go. This proclamation instead set
the stage for a two-step process in which excluded persons were required to report to an
assembly center and, eventually, to be shipped to an internment camp. 213 (The order reprinted
below is an exclusion order carrying out Proclamation Four.)
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Assembly centers were intended to furnish temporary housing for Japanese persons
waiting to be excluded. Two notable centers in California were Santa Anita and Tanforan, both
racetracks in which some persons were housed in horse stalls. The centers were run by the
Army. James Purcell, who became Mitsuye Endo’s lawyer, described Tanforan, in San Bruno,
this way:
My father had been a guard at Folsom Prison for many years and I grew up in that
prison. I was unable to distinguish this “relocation center” at Tanforan from the
prison except that the walls were barbed wire fences; more frequent gun towers;
more difficulty of entering to see a client; and the convicts were better housed than
my American citizen clients who were not accused of any crime.
For example, the couple I went to see, with their three children, were occupying a
stall which had formerly housed only one horse. The cracks in the beams of the
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floor were at least one quarter inch wide. The stall had been whitewashed in some
places over patches of manure. 214
From assembly centers such as Tanforan, excluded persons were shipped to
“relocation centers,” which in much contemporary usage were referred to as “concentration
camps,” in California (Manzanar and Tule Lake), Arizona (Gila River and Poston), Idaho
(Minidoka), Wyoming (Heart Mountain) and Arkansas (Rohwer and Jerome). The camps were
run by a civilian agency created for that purpose, the War Relocation Agency (WRA).

When the evacuation orders issued, the government had not established any custodian to
care for the excluded persons’ property. Business owners were forced to “either turn over their
business to their creditors at great loss or abandon it entirely” while “commercial buzzards” took
214
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“great advantage of this hardship, making offers way below even inventory cost, and very much
below real value.” 215 Some excluded persons stored their possessions in churches, and some
churches were later vandalized to destroy those possessions. 216

With respect to agricultural land, some groups favored exclusion as a means to
appropriate land that Issei had shown could be profitably farmed. Austin E. Anson, representing
the California Shipper-Grower Association, was quoted in the Saturday Evening Post, and later
by Justice Murphy in dissent in Korematsu, 217 as saying:
We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. . . . We do.
It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown
men. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over. . . . They
undersell the white man in the markets. . . . They work their women and children
while the white farmer has to pay wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed
tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can
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take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back
when the war ends, either. 218
An oft-repeated story tells of a World War I veteran named Hideo Murata, who
lived in San Luis Obispo County. In his youth, he had lived in Monterey, and Monterey
County had given him a certificate of honorary citizenship as a testament to its “heartfelt
gratitude, of honor and respect for your loyal and splendid service to the Country in the
Great World War.” 219 When Murata learned of the exclusion orders he consulted his
friend the sheriff, who confirmed the order was real. Murata went to a hotel in Pismo
Beach, checked in, and poisoned himself with strychnine. 220 His certificate was found in
his pocket.
F
As the legal machinery of assembly and exclusion began to grind, The House of
Representatives Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration—more generally
known, after its chair John H. Tolan of California, as the Tolan Committee—held hearings in
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco and Los Angeles to assess the situation of persons of Japanese
descent on the West Coast. The Committee existed before Pearl Harbor, and Carey McWilliams
thought that holding hearings might defuse somewhat the increasing public antagonism towards
Japanese persons—citizens and aliens alike. As it turned out, EO 9066 issued two days before
the hearings began, but the record adduced in the hearings played an important role in
subsequent events.
Attorney General Warren spoke on the first day of the hearing and his testimony sought
to create a record to justify exclusion. The record he presented traced back to his February 2
meeting with California law enforcement officials. In that meeting he had hit upon the idea of
mapping the Japanese population, and he began by referencing his demonstrative exhibits—the
maps he had commissioned. He told the committee “along the coast from Marin County to the
Mexican border virtually every important strategic location and installation has one or more
Japanese in its immediate vicinity.” 221 He recounted a claim by one sheriff that “Japanese
farmers are working within a grenade throw of coast-defense guns” and cited letters he claimed
showed that “our war industries also have numerous Japs in their vicinity . . . .” 222 He concluded
“the Japanese population of California is, as a whole, ideally situated, with reference to points of
strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage.” 223 Warren also
pointed to organized donations by Japanese persons in America to support Japan’s efforts in its
war against China. 224 He also mentioned his effort to bring the Alien Land Law to bear, noting
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its deficiencies but crediting his February 2 conference with producing the maps he used as
demonstrative exhibits. 225
Warren also submitted as exhibits letters he had solicited from law enforcement officials
around the State. 226 As noted earlier, at the February 2 meeting Warren evoked the Pearl Harbor
investigation that had ended the careers of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and Warren had
stressed the need for enforcement officials to be and appear active against any possible sabotage
threats. On February 17 and 18 he sent letters to law enforcement officials around the state that
aimed to germinate this seed. The letters suggested the presence of a risk and sought an
assessment of its extent by posing three questions:
(1) What in your opinion is the extent of the danger, by way of sabotage
and fifth-column activities in your jurisdiction and in the State as a whole,
arising from the presence of enemy aliens?
(2) Do you believe that the danger can be adequately controlled by treating
all enemy aliens alike, regardless of nationality, or do you believe that we
should differentiate among them as to nationality?
(3) What protective measures do you believe should be taken with reference
to each nationality or with reference to enemy aliens as a whole in order
to eliminate the danger of sabotage and fifth-column activities? 227
The responses brimmed with fear. C.B. Horrall, Los Angeles Chief of Police, reported
that on December 8-9 “a large amount of loose hay was piled in the shape of an arrow pointing
to one of our major aviation plants.” 228 The Chief of Police of Marysville—over 150 miles
inland and closer to Nevada than to the Pacific—worried that “this city being as close as it is to
the coast the danger of sabotage and fifth-column activity in this territory is very grave . . . .” 229
The Imperial County district attorney and sheriff estimated that near El Centro—closer to
Arizona than to the Pacific—“the danger from sabotage and fifth-column activities from these
800 alien Japanese enemies is tremendous and very serious.” 230 The D.A. from Madera
County—which stretches from near Fresno to the Eastern Sierras—thought it unusual that “both
before and after December 7, the most influential Japanese in the county had an unusual number
of Japanese calling at his residence at all hours of the day and night. These callers had good cars
and seem to be persons of sorts. He had never had such string of callers before.” 231 This lawyer
had ideas:
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Our State and Federal laws, supported by a bill of rights, are entirely inadequate
to meet the situation. If we are not to run the risk of disaster we must
forget such things as the writ of habeas corpus, and the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right of self-defense, self-preservation,
on behalf of the people, is higher than the bill of rights. Martial law should be
declared over all of California. 232
One correspondent from the Central Valley was more measured. The Fresno D.A. thought there
had not been any danger from alien enemies in the past but “[s]ince the Federal government has
run all the enemy aliens off the various coastal locations and they have been moved into the [San
Juaquin] valley it presents an entirely different picture.” 233 Some letters, and witnesses,
mentioned fire danger as a sabotage risk. 234
Warren summarized the responses as showing “almost a universal conviction among law
enforcement officers in California that there is grave and immediate danger of sabotage and fifthcolumn activities from the Japanese population and that their removal at once from the vicinity
of vital establishments and areas is imperative in order to eliminate such danger.” 235 He did not
overclaim. The District Attorney for San Luis Obispo suggested that all alien Japanese persons
should be shipped “back to Japan,” and that if this were not possible “they should be placed
where they will not compete against the interests of the American people. The best place for
them is in a concentration camp without any frills and just the bare necessities for their
existence.” 236 The District Attorney for San Francisco opined “there is grave danger of sabotage
and fifth-column activities in our jurisdiction, in the event of any invasion by the Japanese and,
further, that even in the absence of such invasion, if utmost precautions are not taken, sabotage
will be committed.” 237 (He did not distinguish among Japanese, Italian, or German aliens,
however.)
Several of Warren’s correspondents favored treating all enemy aliens alike. The Chief of
Police of Santa Paula, in Ventura County, opined:
I can see no reason why we should attempt to control this danger without
treating all enemy aliens alike. While it is true that there are many more Japanese
than other enemy aliens, at the same time it is easy to recognize a Japanese as
such. Other enemy aliens can mix with citizens of the United States with less
chance of being identified as enemy aliens, especially as the enemy alien registration
records are not available to local law-enforcement officers. 238
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Nevertheless, for Warren all this supported the conclusion that “the necessities of the present
situation require the removal of the Japanese from a considerable portion if not from all of
California.” 239
As a good lawyer, Warren also was prepared to rebut possible objections. Some worried
that excluding Japanese persons would harm California agriculture, possibly to the detriment of
the war effort. Warren had the foresight to obtain letters from various agricultural societies
around the state, which he summarized as showing that “the removal of Japanese from California
would have an appreciable but not a serious effect upon California agriculture.” 240 Here, too,
Warren did not exaggerate. The Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles did
find it relevant to note:
A comprehensive system of associations set up for these small Japanese farmers
has enabled them to regulate market supplies and reduce prices at will, to the
point that the competing white grower has been forced out of production.
However, there is a vast reserve of skilled white farmers who will resume the
production of vegetables whenever they have any idea that it can be done without
going up against this type of Japanese competition. This will not entail any
serious rise in prices, generally speaking, as the difference between the Japanese
controlled wholesale price is only a few cents per package less than the white
growers' actual cost of production. However, if white growers are to take up the
production of vegetables in place of Japanese quick action is imperative. 241
Given their vested interest in eliminating competition, these letters were presumably no harder to
get and put in the record than the letters from law enforcement officials.
Warren then reiterated an argument first vetted at his February 2 meeting:
Unfortunately, however, many of our people and some of our authorities and, I
am afraid, many of our people in other parts of the country are of the opinion that
because we have had no sabotage and no fifth column activities in this State since
the beginning of the war, that means that none have been planned for us. But I
take the view that that is the most ominous sign in our whole situation. It
convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage that we are to
get, the fifth column activities that we are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor
was timed and just like the invasion of France, and of Denmark, and of Norway,
and all of those other countries.
I believe that we are just being lulled into a false sense of security and that the
only reason we haven't had disaster in California is because it has been timed for a
different date, and that when that time comes if we don't do something about it it
is going to mean disaster both to California and to our Nation. Our day of
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reckoning is bound to come in that regard. When, nobody knows, of course, but
we are approaching an invisible deadline. 242
Warren also noted “that the consensus of opinion among the law-enforcement officers of
this State is that there is more potential danger among the group of Japanese who are born in this
country than from the alien Japanese who were born in Japan.” 243 Though his testimony
correctly reflected comments at his February 2 meeting, it sought to collapse the distinction
between citizens (Nisei) and non-citizens (Issei). He then testified that race prevented a sound
assessment of loyalty:
We believe that when we are dealing with the Caucasian race we have methods
that will test the loyalty of them, and we believe that we can, in dealing with the
Germans and the Italians, arrive at some fairly sound conclusions because of our
knowledge of the way they live in the community and have lived for many years.
But when we deal with the Japanese we are in an entirely different field and we
cannot form any opinion that we believe to be sound. Their method of living, their
language, make for this difficulty. 244
The Committee heard similar testimony from Robert H. Fouke, representing the Joint
Immigration Committee, the sum of groups long interested in anti-Japanese measures, including
the Native Sons of the Golden West and the American Legion, American Federation of Labor,
and the Grange. Fouke recounted the Committee’s role (then known as the Japanese Exclusion
League) in adopting the Alien Land Laws, and echoed Representative Leland Ford’s argument
that aliens could prove their loyalty by being excluded from designated areas. 245 The City
Manager of Oakland and other witnesses repeated the point as well. 246
Mike Masaoka, National Secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League (“JACL”),
a Nisei group limited to citizen members, testified as well:
If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese
residents from the West coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this
Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in
that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a
measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure
groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we
have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as
American citizens. 247
Masaoka stressed Nisei loyalty, but was hard pressed to comment on reports of alleged
sabotage in Hawaii. Representative Tolan, for example, asked Masaoka to comment on
“authentic pictures during the attack showing hundreds of Japanese old automobiles cluttered on
242
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the one street of Honolulu so the Army could not get to the ships.” 248 Dave Tatsuno, President of
the San Francisco JACL chapter, testified “Saturday, Attorney General Earl Warren said that
because so far there hasn't been a single sign of fifth-column activity that is a sign that there is
fifth-column activity. But I disagree with that. I don't think that is real logic.” 249
Representative Laurence F. Arnold, of Illinois, asked whether the Alien Land Laws had
engendered resentment among persons of Japanese descent. Masaoka and Henry P. Tani, of the
San Francisco JACL Chapter, testified that resentment might possibly exist among Issei but that
Nisei could own land, prompting this colloquy:
Mr. Arnold. Do you know of any instances where Japanese aliens have acquired
property in this State in the name of their children in order to avoid the property
laws?
Mr. Tani. Sure. My father bought a house in my name and my sister's name and
he had a lawyer named as trustee. That was the usual procedure, but we lived in
that house. 250
The Tolan Committee issued findings in May 1942. It concluded that “[l]iquidation of
real and personal property held by evacuees is proceeding at a rapid pace, in many instances at
great sacrifice.” 251 The Committee rejected “any suggestion to intern all evacuees,” though this
was in fact done. 252 The Committee found the “main geographic pattern of Japanese population
in California was pretty well fixed by 1910.” 253 This finding was not as specific as Warren’s
maps, but was consistent with testimony that, for example, the Japanese colony on Terminal
Island (a small island in Long Beach harbor) long predated the Naval facilities that were
ostensibly under risk of sabotage. 254 Committee members cross-examined Messrs. Masaoka and
Tatsuno on assumed incidents of sabotage at Pearl Harbor; a footnote in the Committee’s
Preliminary Report referenced evidence that no such sabotage occurred. 255 The Final Report
reprinted a letter from Assistant Attorney General Rowe confirming that the FBI had found no
evidence of sabotage at Pearl Harbor. 256
In Japanese-American Relocation Reviewed, a volume in an oral history project
conducted by the Bancroft Library at U.C. Berkeley, Mike Masaoka stated “probably more than
any single person in my judgment at least—Earl Warren influenced the Executive decision to
authorize and carry out the mass military evacuation and exclusion of all persons of Japanese
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origin from all of California and the western halves of Arizona, Oregon, and Washington,
without trial or hearing of any kind, at a time when all of our courts were functioning, early in
1942.” 257 A trio of Berkeley professors disputed the blame placed on Warren on the ground that
“there remains no proof that Warren ever publicly declared himself in favor of mass evacuation
prior to mid-February” 1942, at which point the decision was essentially made. 258 Conceding the
point regarding public statements leaves open the question whether Warren could be criticized
for private actions or, perhaps more pertinently, for what he might have done differently.
III
Four legal challenges are relevant here.
A

Minori Yasui was a U.S. citizen, a second lieutenant in the Army reserve, and a graduate
of the University of Oregon law school. (You may listen to an interview with Mr. Yasui,
comprising 14 segments, here.) Unable to find good work as a lawyer in Oregon, at his father’s
suggestion Yasui took a job at the Japanese embassy in Chicago. After Pearl Harbor, Yasui
returned to Oregon. His father had been arrested as a suspicious enemy alien, taken to Missoula
Montana, given a hearing, and detained in custody. (He was released in 1945). Angered by his
father’s treatment, and by the racial nature of the exclusion orders, 259 on March 28, 1942, the day
curfew orders took effect, Yasui walked into a Portland police station shortly after 6:00 pm and
demanded to be arrested for violating the curfew order. 260
Yasui was convicted in a bench trial held on June 12, 1942. The court did not rule until
November; in the meantime Yasui was held for three months in the Portland assembly center and
two months in the camp at Minidoka, Idaho. 261 In November the district court held that that “[i]f
257
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Congress attempted to classify citizens based upon color or race and to apply criminal penalties
for a violation of regulations, founded upon that distinction, the action is insofar void. 262 But
though the government did not contest Yasui’s citizenship, the court then found that Yasui had
forfeited his citizenship by working at the Japanese consulate “as a propaganda agent for the
Emperor.” Though another American, named Murphy, “presumably not of Japanese extraction,”
did the same work, the court held Yasui “made an election and chose allegiance to the Emperor
of Japan, rather than citizenship in the United States at his majority.” 263
Yasui was sentenced in November 1942. He then spent nine months in solitary
confinement in Portland before being transferred back to Minidoka. Yasui was represented by
Earl Bernard, a lawyer from Portland who was a family acquaintance. The ACLU did not
participate in the case because Bernard did not ask for help and because the organization was
wary of Yasui’s work in the Japanese consulate in Chicago.
B

Gordon Hirabayashi was a senior at the University of Washington. Born in Washington,
Hirabayashi gravitated toward Quaker religious teaching and registered as a conscientious
objector to the draft. (You may listen to an interview with Mr. Hirabayashi, comprising 16 parts,
here.) Civilian Exclusion Order 57 required Hirabayashi to register on May 11 for exclusion on
262
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May 16. On May 16, 1942, Hirabayashi appeared at the FBI office (which his lawyer had called
earlier) with a four-page statement entitled “why I refuse to register for evacuation.” When
arrested, he had in his possession a diary noting that he had violated the curfew order. 264
Hirabayashi was charged with two counts: violating the curfew order and failing to report
for exclusion. 265 He was imprisoned awaiting trial until October 20, 1942. His counsel opted for
a jury trial, but Hirabayashi took the stand and admitted that he violated each order. He was
convicted. The district court initially sentenced him to 30 days imprisonment on each count.
Hirabayashi then said that he had been told that he would not be allowed to work outside the
prison cell blocks if his sentence were less than 90 days. The court therefore sentenced him to 90
days on each count, to be served concurrently.
C

Fred Korematsu was a welder born in Oakland, California. (You may listen to an
interview with Mr. Korematsu, comprising 11 segments, here.) 266 He failed to report to an
assembly center on May 9, 1942, and was arrested on May 30, 1942. He had volunteered for the
Navy in June 1941 but had been turned down because of ulcers. He had been a member of the
Boiler Makers Union but was expelled after Pearl Harbor and lost his job. When arrested he bore
scars from a plastic surgery procedure he underwent before the exclusion order took effect. It
was intended to obscure his racial identity—he had planned to move to the Midwest with his
fiancé and hoped the surgery would help him fit in there. She broke up with him after he was
arrested. On September 8, Korematsu was tried and convicted of violating the exclusion order—
remaining in an area in which he was not permitted. The trial court sentenced him to five years’
probation but stated that pronouncement of judgment would be suspended.
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D

Mitsuye Endo was born in 1920 in Sacramento, California. 267 She attended secretarial
school and got a job with the State Department of Employment. Her brother served in the Army.
The California State Personnel Board had required all employees of Japanese descent to fill out
loyalty oath forms, as a preliminary step to terminating all of them. Attorney General Warren
opined that such termination would be illegal, 268 but the Personnel Board proceeded anyway. 269
Termination was mooted by the exclusion orders, but lawyers who had planned to try to thwart
termination followed up by visiting the Tanforan assembly center near San Francisco. They
created their own questionnaire, designed to identify an internee who would make a sympathetic
plaintiff to challenge detention and confinement in assembly and relocation centers.
Unlike Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu, Ms. Endo had obeyed the orders. Her
complaint was that she was forcibly detained. On July 13, 1942, her counsel filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the challenges in the other cases, this petition directly contested
the government’s right to hold persons of Japanese descent. A hearing was held on July 20,
1942. At the end of the hearing, the district judge called for briefing within ten days and
indicated that he would issue a ruling five days thereafter. Months of judicial silence ensued.
Endo’s lawyer felt the passage of time helped his client because the U.S. war effort fared poorly
in the first half of 1942 but began to improve thereafter. Ms. Endo’s counsel waited until June
1943 to nudge the court to rule, but by that time the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases were pending
in the Supreme Court. Once that Court decided those cases, the district court in Endo denied the
petition.
Ms. Endo was represented by James Purcell, a San Francisco attorney. The two never met
or spoke in person.
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E
In these cases, the government had to decide how to justify curfew and exclusion
(Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Yasui) and detention (Endo) in court. A June 1942 memorandum
from Maurice Walk, Assistant Solicitor of the WRA, stated the problem as being that “the facts
relied on to vindicate the legality of this differential treatment,” by which he meant exclusion of
Japanese citizens but not German or Italian aliens or citizens, “are not susceptible of proof by the
ordinary types of evidence.” 270 Walk’s proposed solution was to ask the courts to take judicial
notice of propositions including: “[t]here is a Japanese fifth column in this country of
undisclosed and undetermined dimensions . . . composed of American citizens of Japanese
descent”; “it is impossible to make a particular investigation of the loyalty of each person in the
Japanese community” in part because of “the difficulties which the Caucasian experiences with
Oriental psychology”; and “Americans of Japanese descent have been severely discriminated
against, socially and economically, by the general American public . . . Americans of Japanese
descent know this discrimination, and have been embittered by it. 271
As it turned out, the trial courts felt able to proceed without receiving evidence. The
government attempted to introduce one percipient witness in Min Yasui’s case but they called
him as a rebuttal witness when Yasui had not introduced any evidence in his case that the
witness could rebut. 272 Judge Fee was not interested in a proffered expert witness, and the
government did not ask formally that the court take judicial notice of anything. Judges in the
other cases proceeded as if their own knowledge was sufficient. The government saved its
judicial notice arguments for appeal.
F
Yasui and Hirabayashi were consolidated for review by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which chose to hear the case en banc. The appeal was argued on February 19,
1943. After argument the cases were certified to the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to the thengoverning provision, 28 U.S.C. § 346. 273 According to Professor Irons, in March 1943 Ennis
and Burling met with the ACLU’s Roger Baldwin and told him that Endo was the only case the
Justice Department felt it would lose. As of that date, however, the district court had not ruled
on Ms. Endo’s habeas petition. Ennis and Burling reportedly advised Baldwin that Ms. Endo’s
counsel needed to expedite a ruling. 274 Professor Irons concludes that Ennis and Burling had in
mind an expedited appeal of Endo, to be argued with the certified appeals in Yasui and
Hirabayashi. In the event, however, the district court did not rule in Endo until the Supreme
Court had decided Hirabayashi.
Two amicus briefs in Hirabayashi and Yasui are notable. The first, submitted by the
states of California, Oregon, and Washington, supported exclusion. Professor Irons states that the
brief was written by Herbert Wenig, a lawyer who had been on Warren’s staff at the California
attorney general’s office but who had moved to the Army. Professor Irons believes Wenig’s role
270
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violated judicial rules. 275 The second brief, filed on behalf of the JACL, is notable in two
respects. It is a beautiful example of the use of facts as effective rhetoric, a so-called “Brandeis
brief.” It also, according to Professor Irons, was largely written by Morris Opler, a non-lawyer
WRA employee who worked at the Manzanar camp. 276
In Hirabayashi v. United States, 277 the Supreme Court affirmed Gordon Hirabayashi’s
conviction for violating the curfew order. The Court held that Public Law 503 ratified EO 9066
and gave it the force of law. Hirabayashi argued that the law, which did not specify any
particular order or any set of persons to which it might pertain, was an unconstitutional
delegation of power. Focusing on the curfew order, the Court disagreed. It held that after Pearl
Harbor military officials had “ample ground for concluding that they must face the danger of
invasion” and that the law did not require
the military authorities to impose the curfew on all citizens within the military
area, or on none. In a case of threatened danger requiring prompt action, it is a
choice between inflicting obviously needless hardship on the many or sitting
passive and unresisting in the presence of the threat. We think that constitutional
government, in time of war, is not so powerless and does not compel so hard a
choice if those charged with the responsibility of our national defense have
reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real. 278
The Court offered a non-exhaustive list of reasons it thought the military might
reasonably distinguish Japanese citizens from others: “social economic and political conditions”
might have impeded assimilation and fostered a sense of separateness among Japanese
citizens, 279 many Japanese children attended Japanese-language schools, some of which were
believed to proselytize for Japan, 280 approximately 10,000 citizen children (Kibei) had been sent
to Japan for part of their education, 281 and under Japanese law many persons who were American
citizens were also deemed Japanese citizens. 282
With respect to the discrimination effected by the orders, the Court noted that the Fifth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to states, contained no equal
protection clause. The Court nevertheless stated that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are, by their very, nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality,” but concluded that “it is enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national
defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made. Whether we would have
made it is irrelevant.” 283 The Court thus upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating curfew on
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this ground. Because his sentence for violating the order to report for exclusion ran concurrently
with his sentence for the curfew violation, the Court declined to rule on that count. 284 Because
Minori Yasui had only been convicted for violating curfew, the Court ruled against him on the
same ground. 285 Neither case produced a ruling on the lawfulness of requiring Japanese citizens
to report for exclusion. 286
Hirabayashi and Yasui issued in 1943, the same year the military lifted a 1942 reclassification decision that rendered Nisei ineligible for military service. One result was the
100th Infantry Battalion, later integrated into the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, comprised
of Nisei soldiers (though company-level officers were White). 287 The 442nd was recruited from
Nisei in Hawaii, who were not interned, and from the camps themselves; their families remained
in camps. (Daniel Inouye, later a senator from Hawaii, recalls a trip to the Rohwer, Arkansas
camp here.) 288
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Soldiers from the 442nd fought in Italy and were among the troops who liberated Dachau. The
regiment’s slogan was: “Go for Broke.” The motto of the 100th Infantry Battalion was:
“Remember Pearl Harbor.”

In addition, approximately 6,000 persons of Japanese descent served in the Pacific Theater as
translators for the Military Intelligence Service. 289 Some of these soldiers were recruited from
internment camps. 290 Their duties included attempting to secure the surrender of Japanese
soldiers ensconced in caves on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
By 1944, internment was two years old, internees were now subject to the draft, and it
was clear that Japan was at no risk of invading California. 291 Yet internment continued even
absent that risk, and even though continued internment both denied internees their liberty and
worsened their economic circumstances. In 1944, Carey McWilliams noted that wages paid in
the camps were insufficient to pay fixed-cost obligations such as life insurance premiums. “As a
consequence, it is estimated that the residents of the two centers in Arizona alone are being
pauperized at the rate of about $500,000 a year.” 292 Substantial evidence suggests that President
Roosevelt delayed ending internment until after the 1944 presidential election. 293 This political

289

James C. McNaughton, NISEI LINGUISTS, JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

DURING WORLD WAR II (2006); https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/military-intelligence-service-

translators-interpreters.
290
https://barbedwiretobattlefields.org/videos/military-intelligence.mp4.
291
Eric Muller has shown that informed military opinion thought invasion unlikely even in 1942. Eric L. Muller,
Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1333 (2010). Available at:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol88/iss4/5. Note, however, that as late as February 10, 1942, Secretary Stimson
was worrying about a possible invasion, albeit at some future time.
292
Id. at 140.
293
E.g., Bird, supra note 121 at 171. McWilliams surveyed the politics surrounding the WRA. McWilliams, supra
note 1, at 232.

57

decision ultimately forced the Court to confront detention, though it still was able to limit the
scope of its decisions.
As noted above, the district court denied Mitsuye Endo’s petition shortly after the opinion
in Hirabayashi issued. Her case was thus ready for appeal just as the Supreme Court remanded
Korematsu, having found that the district court’s judgment was appealable. 294 The Ninth Circuit
then affirmed Korematsu’s conviction without further argument, relying on Hirabayashi.
According to Professor Irons, the DOJ’s Ennis met with the ACLU’s Baldwin to advise him on
how to best position the cases for appeal. 295 The Ninth Circuit certified Korematsu to the
Supreme Court, and the two cases were argued on October 11-12, 1944.
Because Fred Korematsu had been arrested for violating the exclusion order, the Court
could not sidestep the exclusion aspect of the military orders as it had done in Hirabayashi.
Relying on its analysis in Hirabayashi, the Court ruled that
exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close
relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. The military authorities,
charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that
curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. They did so, as
pointed out in our Hirabayashi opinion, in accordance with Congressional
authority to the military to say who should, and who should not, remain in the
threatened areas. 296
The Court noted that Korematsu challenged the conclusion that the mainland was in danger of
invasion in May 1942, when the exclusion order pertaining to Korematsu was issued. But the
Court dismissed the challenge:
Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because
of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group,
most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we
could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to
bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we
sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In the
instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on
the same ground. The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the
same reason a military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was
in the nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of Japanese
origin. 297
Finally, the Court noted that Fred Korematsu had been convicted only of remaining in an
exclusion zone, not for failing to report to an assembly center for detention followed by actual
exclusion. The Court therefore declined to rule on orders to report to assembly centers or on the
actual detention of citizens in what the Court—objecting to the term “concentration camps”—
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referred to as “relocation centers.” 298 The dissents of Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson,
bear reading in full. The opinion in Korematsu issued on December 18, 1944.
Ex Parte Endo was argued on October 12, 1944, the second day of argument in
Korematsu. Before argument, the government offered to release Ms. Endo provided she did not
return to California. She declined. 299 The opinion in Ex Parte Endo issued December 18, the
same day as Korematsu. Because Mitsuye Endo complied with all applicable orders, hers was the
only case that did not challenge a particular order but instead challenged the power of the United
States to hold her in detention. The Court ruled that Public Law 503, which provided penalties
for defying an order issued by a military commander pursuant to EO 9066, did not authorize
detention of loyal citizens, as the government conceded Ms. Endo was:
We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that
conclusion, we do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have
been argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority
may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens
who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure. 300
Noting that “[n]either the Act nor the orders uses the language of detention, 301 the Court
nonetheless appeared to approve of some period of detention as ancillary to exclusion:
We do not mean to imply that detention in connection with no phase of the
evacuation program would be lawful. The fact that the Act and the orders are
silent on detention does not, of course, mean that any power to detain is lacking.
Some such power might indeed be necessary to the successful operation of the
evacuation program. At least we may so assume. Moreover, we may assume for
the purposes of this case that initial detention in Relocation Centers was
authorized. 302
The Court nonetheless ordered Endo released because the governing statute and orders
were anti-sabotage measures and Mitsuye Endo’s conceded loyalty showed she did not pose a
risk of sabotage. 303 The net result of the four cases was that the Court found curfew and
exclusion lawful, assumed initial detention was also lawful, but held that detention could not
persist once loyalty was established.
The opinion in Endo issued on Monday, December 18, 1944. On Sunday, December 17,
the WRA announced that persons in internment camps whose records were clean for two years
would be released and would be permitted free movement. 304 The WRA thus effectively
revoked DeWitt’s exclusion orders and freed Mitsuye Endo the day before the Supreme Court
announced her freedom. Hearsay evidence recounted by Endo’s lawyer, James Purcell, and
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repeated by historian Roger Daniels, claims that Justice Frankfurter alerted John McCloy to the
date the Court’s decision would be released and, presumably, to its content. 305
IV
In 1980 a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (“CWRIC”)
was established to review the exclusion policy and recommend appropriate remedies. The
CWRIC held 20 days of hearings and took testimony of over 750 witnesses. These hearings led
to congressional hearings, which led eventually to enactment of Public Law 100-383, which
provided certain compensation for American citizens and lawful residents who had been
interned. 306
A
The CWRIC’s research also led a group of lawyers to file petitions for the common law
writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate the convictions of Min Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi,
and Fred Korematsu. (Mitsuye Endo, it will be recalled, had no conviction to vacate.) The
petitions were based on allegations that lawyers for the United States suppressed evidence and
engaged in other misconduct in relation to the three cases. The petition claimed that in arguing
these cases the government altered evidence offered to support exclusion and suppressed
evidence, notably the Ringle report, contradicting the case for exclusion. Improper coordination
between the War Department and Western States was also alleged.
The alteration allegation concerned General DeWitt’s final report on exclusion. The
report recited arguments justifying exclusion. It included references to the number of Japanese
organizations on the West Coast, referenced concern over “unauthorized radio communications”
emanating from the coast, 307 as well as “illicit signalling” and “nightly observation of signaling
lamps,” 308 and asserted that for weeks following December 7 “substantially every ship leaving a
West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine.” 309 He noted that a “spot raid” (without a
warrant) in Monterey yielded “more than 60,000 rounds of ammunition and many rifles,
shotguns and maps of all kinds.” 310 DeWitt pointed out that over “two-thirds of the total
Japanese population on the West Coast were not subject to alien enemy regulations,” by which
he meant that they were U.S. citizens. 311 He also recounted the Justice Department’s
unwillingness to administer a mass exclusion. 312 The report echoed without citation Warren’s
Tolan Committee testimony arguing that the location of Japanese residences and farms was
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suspicious, 313 and Warren’s argument that the numerous Japanese organizations provided
evidence of coordination and control. 314
DeWitt sent a bound copy to John McCloy on April 15, 1943. In an April 19, 1943
telephone call, McCloy complained to Col. Bendetsen that the report arrived in bound form
“[b]ecause we worked together on this thing . . . it contains a lot of stuff that I question the
wisdom of and it certainly complicates it to get it in a printed form such as this.” McCloy
complained in particular that the report was “self-glorifying and too self-serving” and that it
implied that Japanese persons would not be allowed to return to the area under General DeWitt’s
command. Whether return would be allowed in 1943 was a hotly debated issue on which
McCloy and the Army differed. According to Bendetsen’s May 3, 1943 notes, McCloy sought to
remove language in DeWitt’s report stating the internment would last the duration of the war and
he sought to rewrite a portion of the report stating that it was impossible to determine whether a
person of Japanese descent was loyal; McCloy favored language stating that exclusion was
necessary because there was not enough time to do so. 315 The final report was rewritten to
reflect McCoy’s change, and the original copies were recalled and destroyed.
With respect to suppression, the Ringle report had been sent to Attorney General Biddle
in March 1942, and Biddle sent the report to McCloy, who replied that he had met Ringle and
been favorably impressed with him. 316 After Japanese persons were interned in camps under
WRA authority, Ringle assembled a compilation of his memoranda for use by the WRA. This
compilation did not include Ringle’s opposition to exclusion, which had already occurred by this
time, but it did include portions of the January 1942 report stating the large majority of Japanese
aliens were at least passively loyal, that at least 75 percent of citizens were loyal, and that the
riskiest persons were already in detention. 317 In October 1942, a version of the Ringle
compilation appeared under an anonymous byline (“An Intelligence Officer”) in Harpers
Magazine.
On April 19, 1943, Ennis wrote a memorandum to Solicitor General Fahy noting that on
that date the Justice Department received “a printed report from General DeWitt about the
Japanese evacuation” and was reviewing it to determine whether to release it publicly so it could
be referenced in the government’s briefing. 318 On April 30, 1943, Ennis sent Fahy a
memorandum describing the article and connecting it to Ringle. Ennis also attached a copy of the
Ringle memorandum, which he had obtained. Ennis wrote that the Justice Department had erred
in not bringing Naval Intelligence into discussions over internment in early 1942 and attributed
this failure to Secretary Knox’s anti-Japanese comments. Ennis reported that he had been told
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that before the war the Army and Navy had agreed in writing to a division of intelligence labor,
and that under this agreement the Navy was responsible for Japanese-related intelligence.
Recall that the Ringle report had advocated exclusion only of persons identified as
suspicious, Kibei (citizens sent to Japan for their education) and parents of Kibei. Ennis urged
Fahy that, “in view of the fact that the Department of Justice is now representing the Army” and
“is arguing that a partial, selective evacuation was impracticable,”
[W]e should consider most carefully what our obligation to the Court is in view of
the fact that the responsible Intelligence agency regarded a selective evacuation as
not only sufficient but preferable. . . . certainly one of the most difficult questions
in the whole case is raised by the fact that the Army did not evacuate people after
any hearing or on any individual determination of dangerousness, but evacuated
the entire racial group. . . . In one of the crucial points in the case the Government
is forced to argue that individual, selective evacuation would have been
impractical and insufficient when we have positive knowledge that the only
Intelligence agency responsible for advising Gen. DeWitt gave him advice
directly to the contrary. 319
Ennis suggested that the Justice Department consider whether it had a duty to advise the
Court of the Ringle memorandum: “It occurs to me that any other course of conduct might
approximate the suppression of evidence.” 320 The filed brief made no reference to Ringle and
cited the Harper’s article in one footnote. Fahy signed the brief as Solicitor General, and Ennis
signed as Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit.
As noted above, Korematsu and Endo were argued in 1944. In connection with these
cases, Ennis increased his efforts to have the Justice Department disavow factual representations
made in the DeWitt report. On February 26, 1944, Ennis wrote Attorney General Biddle a
memorandum recommending that the Justice Department correct on the public record
misstatements in DeWitt’s report. In part this memorandum disputed DeWitt’s portrayal of the
Justice Department, but Ennis referenced a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Biddle
disputing the report, 321 and Ennis stated that the Federal Communications Commission had
confirmed that DeWitt’s references to illegal radio transmissions were untrue. 322 Ennis
suggested Biddle write the FCC seeking its views directly, which Biddle did. The FCC’s
response (including a detailed memorandum) stated that after December 7, 1941 the FCC had
closely monitored radio transmissions on the West Coast and found “no radio signals reported to
the Commission which could not be identified, or which were unlawful.” 323 In addition, as noted
above, Biddle had received the original Ringle report in March 1942 and shared it with McCloy.
In view of their dissatisfaction with the DeWitt report, Ennis and Burling attempted to
disavow it in the government’s brief in Korematsu. The brief was due in October. On September
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11, 1944, Burling sent a memorandum to Herbert Wechsler documenting changes to a footnote
in the government’s brief pertaining to the DeWitt report. Burling wrote that the original text of
the footnote stated that the government relied on the DeWitt report only “for statistics and other
details concerning the actual evacuation and events subsequent thereto.” The note then said that
DeWitt’s “recital of circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of military necessity . . .
is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and shoreto-ship signalling by persons of Japanese ancestry in conflict with information in possession of
the Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the reports on this matter, we do not
ask the Court to take judicial notice of the recital of those facts contained in the Report.” 324
Burling reported to Wechsler that Solicitor General Fahy had altered the last sentence to state
that the DeWitt report’s description was “in conflict with the views of this Department. We
therefore do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of those facts contained in the report.” 325
Burling sought to enlist Wechsler in restoring the original language because he thought Fahy’s
revision suggested the difference between Justice and DeWitt was a matter of interpretation
whereas Burling considered it a matter in which the FCC established facts and DeWitt had lied
about them.
The brief, with Fahy’s revised footnote, was sent to the War Department. It was due to be
filed on October 5. According to a memorandum Burling wrote to Ennis for the purpose of
documenting events, on September 30, 1944, a War Department official (Captain Fisher) called
Ennis and asked for a change to the footnote. According to Burling, “it became necessary for
[Ennis] to suggest the possibility . . . that the brief had gone for final printing,” at which point
McCloy called Fahy and “the printing stopped about noon.”
That same day, Ennis wrote Wechsler a memorandum stating that Ennis and Burling felt
strongly that:
(1) This Department has an ethical obligation to the Court to refrain from citing
[the DeWitt report] it as a source of which the Court may properly take judicial
notice if the Department knows that important statements in the report are untrue
and if it knows as to other statements that there is such contrariety of information
that judicial notice is improper. (2) Since the War Department has published a
history of the evacuation containing important misstatements of fact, including
imputations and inferences that the inaction and timidity of this Department made
the drastic action of evacuation necessary, this Department has an obligation,
within its own competence, to set the record straight so that the true history may
ultimately become known.
Ennis asked Wechsler to inform Biddle of the dispute, because “[m]uch more is involved than
the wording of the footnote. The failure to deal adequately now with this Report cited to the
Supreme Court either by the Government or other parties, will hopelessly undermine our
administrative position in relation to this Japanese problem. We have proved unable to cope
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with the military authorities on their own ground in these matters. If we fail to act forthrightly
on our own ground in the courts, the whole historical record of this matter will be as the military
choose to state it.”
On the evening of September 30, Ennis, Burling, Captain Fisher, and Wechsler met
regarding the footnote. On October 2, Solicitor General Fahy prepared a revised version of the
footnote that contradicted DeWitt’s report only with respect to issues on which the FCC and FBI
contradicted the report. Ennis and Burling proposed a revision in which those items were treated
as examples of more general flaws and were told that the Solicitor General’s draft was final and
all that remained was for them to decide whether to sign the brief. Wechsler intervened,
however, and rewrote the footnote to present two alternatives to the War Department.
As recounted by Captain Fisher at the War Department, the first alternative asked the
Court to take judicial notice of DeWitt’s report only insofar as recited in the brief; the second
alternative stated that the government did not seek judicial notice of facts relating to transmitters
or signaling because on those topics DeWitt’s report conflicted with information the government
possessed. Captain Fisher did not agree to either but stated the first was preferable. Footnote two
of the government brief thus read:
The Final Report of General DeWitt (which is dated June 5, 1943, but which was
not made public until January 1944), hereinafter cited as Final Report, is relied on
in this brief for statistics and other details concerning the actual evacuation and
the events that took place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this
brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of which we ask the
Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent
that it relates to such facts.
Ennis and Burling both signed the government’s brief.
In an oral history recorded in 1978, Professor Wechsler summarized this episode:
These were nice cases for testing the role of the government lawyer. The thing
about those briefs is that they declined to make arguments that the War
Department in particular wanted to be made, which we considered to be specious,
either in law or in fact, the primary importance being refusing to make arguments
that were specious in fact, because those are the arguments that can mislead a
court. The War Department had an entirely misguided conception of what the
record was in the Korematsu case. We refused, for example, to draw any strength
from the Commanding General’s report, because we regarded it as spurious. 326
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B
Based largely on the foregoing, the District Court for the Northern District of California
granted Fred Korematsu’s petition for writ of coram nobis. 327 The government opposed the
petition sought to vacate Korematsu’s conviction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48.
The court found that Rule 48 did not apply. In a somewhat ironic twist, the court was asked to
take judicial notice of the CWRIC’s Personal Justice Denied report and several of the documents
linked above (submitted as exhibits to the petition). The court took limited judicial notice of the
report. The court declined to take judicial notice of the documents but found it could consider
them for non-hearsay purposes. 328 Judge Patel concluded that the final footnote in the
government’s Korematsu brief “made no mention of the contradictory reports” and concluded
that “[t]hese omissions are critical.” 329 Judge Patel found that
Omitted from the reports presented to the courts was information possessed by the
Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Navy, and the
Justice Department which directly contradicted General DeWitt's statements. Thus,
the court had before it a selective record.
Whether a fuller, more accurate record would have prompted a different decision
cannot be determined. Nor need it be determined. Where relevant evidence has
been withheld, it is ample justification for the government's concurrence that the
conviction should be set aside. It is sufficient to satisfy the court's independent
inquiry and justify the relief sought by petitioner. 330
Judge Patel did not cite a legal requirement for production of information from the FCC, FBI, or
ONI. The government appealed this order but then withdrew the appeal. 331
Minori Yasui’s petition for a writ of coram nobis was denied. In his case, the government
responded with a motion to dismiss the indictment against him, vacate his conviction, and deny
his petition. 332 This was in essence the same Rule 48 motion denied in Korematsu. The motion
was granted in Yasui’s case. Yasui filed a notice of appeal, which the government moved to
dismiss as untimely. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government and remanded for the district
court to determine whether the untimely filing was due to excusable neglect. Mr. Yasui died
during the course of appellate proceedings, mooting his petition.
Gordon Hirabayashi’s petition produced an evidentiary hearing, and thus the most
complete record in these cases. 333 Because Hirabayashi’s case was argued in 1943, the 1944
record Ennis assembled was not relevant to Hirabayashi’s petition. The court thus focused on
and accepted Hirabayashi’s argument that McCloy’s changes to the DeWitt report materially
changed its import by masking the degree to which DeWitt’s conclusion rested on stereotypes
and suggesting instead that there was insufficient time to make individual determinations of
327
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loyalty. 334 The court found that “a copy of the original version of the Final Report was never
made available to the Justice Department” which therefore wrongly “assumed and argued to the
Supreme Court that the military necessity arose out of a lack of time to make a separation rather
than out of an impossibility of making that separation.” 335 The court found:
The error of which petitioner complains is that, during the pendency of his appeal
before the Supreme Court, neither he nor his counsel was informed by the
government of the reason given by General DeWitt in the original version of his
Final Report for the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast. That statement was in essence that the military necessity, requiring the
exclusion, was the impossibility of separating the loyal persons from the disloyal
ones no matter how much time was devoted to that task.
It was General DeWitt who made the decision that military necessity required the
exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. The central
issue before the Supreme Court in the appeal of petitioner from his conviction on
the first count was whether exclusion was in fact required by military necessity.
Nothing would have been more important to petitioner's counsel than to know just
why it was that General DeWitt made the decision that he did. 336
The court noted testimony by Edward Ennis that, had he known of DeWitt’s statement in 1943,
“it would have presented `a very serious problem’ and that it would have been `very dangerous’
to take that position before the Supreme Court.” 337 The court found that failure to disclose
DeWitt’s original justification to Hirabayashi and to the Supreme Court prejudiced him with
respect to his conviction for failure to report to an assembly center and thus granted his petition
on that count. 338 The court denied the petition with respect to the curfew violation on the ground
that it had been superseded by exclusion orders and that failure to disclose DeWitt’s justification
for exclusion did not undermine Hirabayashi’s conviction for violation of the more modest
curfew order. 339
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Mary Schroeder. 340 In response to the
government’s argument that the record did not support a finding of prejudice, the Ninth Circuit
recounted Ennis as testifying that in 1943 the War Department had given him “only a few
selected pages” and depicted Ennis as testifying that had he seen DeWitt’s real comments he
would have informed the Supreme Court. 341 The latter point overstates the district court’s
description of the testimony. On the former point, in 1944 Ennis stated to Wechsler that he had
received 40 pages of the original DeWitt report, which he regrettably returned to the War
Department. 342 The change the court found prejudicial occurs on page nine of the final report. If
in 1943 the War Department gave Justice the summary material at the beginning of the report, it
is possible that the Justice Department briefly did possess the original language.
Professor Jerry Kang questions the prejudice finding, arguing that DeWitt’s racism was
notorious and DeWitt’s statements to newspapers following a congressional hearing that “I don’t
want any Jap back on the Coast,” “There is no way to determine their loyalty,” and “A Jap is a
Jap” were reprinted in Hirabayashi’s reply brief, mentioned at Minori Yasui’s argument, and
quoted in Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu a year later. 343 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
reference to the special credence given statements made by the Solicitor General, 344 and its
affirmance of the district court finding that Hirabayashi was prejudiced by a lack of government
candor, Kang faulted the prejudice argument as implying that candor would have changed the
Supreme Court’s mind when, in his view, it wouldn’t have.
To synthesize Professor Kang’s points: a Court dominated by justices appointed by
Franklin Roosevelt; a Court that in its Endo opinion quoted, with exquisite unacknowledged
irony, FDR’s praise for the loyalty of most persons of Japanese descent; 345 a Court that in
Hirabayashi ignored an order to report for exclusion and ruled only on a curfew violation, thus
collapsing the two convictions, yet in Korematsu affirmed a conviction for remaining in an
exclusion zone when the only alternative was to report to an assembly center, which was a
preliminary step on the road to internment, 346 thus separating on the most formal of grounds an
inseparable government policy; a Court that ruled on Mitsuye Endo’s habeas petition as a matter
of statutory interpretation and refused to entertain any constitutional challenge to her arrest,
transportation, and imprisonment —that Court could and would do whatever it wanted. Professor
Kang’s view implies that, had full disclosure been made, the Court would have had no trouble
concluding that the power to determine military necessity was vested in the War Department and
its designees, not the FBI, not the FCC, and not the DOJ.
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C
No transcript exists for the Hirabayashi or Yasui Supreme Court arguments. Professor
Peter Irons, who also acted as one of petitioners’ counsel in the coram nobis proceedings,
discovered a partial transcript of the Korematsu argument after the evidentiary hearing in Gordon
Hirabayashi’s case. 347 Professor Irons wrote that the transcript showed Solicitor General Fahy
misleading the Court in certain respects. 348 Professor Irons believed the following comment
misleading:
The final report of General DeWitt was held up to Your Honors yesterday as
proving that he himself had no rational basis on which to make a military
judgment. I am not going into the details of that report, because no doubt the
Court will read it. However, I do assert that there is not a single line, a single
word, or a single syllable in that report which in any way justifies the statement
that General DeWitt did not believe he had, and did not have, a sufficient basis, in
honesty and good faith, to believe that the measures which he took were required
as a military necessity in protection of the West Coast. 349
Professor Irons took issue with another statement Fahy made:
It is even suggested that because of some foot note in our brief in this case
indicating that we do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of every
recitation or instance in the final report of General DeWitt, that the Government
has repudiated the military necessity of the evacuation. It seems to me, if the Court
please, that that is a neat little piece of fancy dancing. There is nothing in the brief
of the Government which is any different in this respect from the position it has
always maintained since the Hirabayashi case—that not only the military judgment
of the general, but the judgment of the Government of the United States, has
always been in justification of the measures taken; and no person in any
responsible position has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does
not do so now. Nothing in its brief can validly be used to the contrary. 350
Professor Irons judges this statement “a flat out lie” because Ennis, as Director of the
Justice Department’s Alien Enemy Control Unit, “had consistently opposed the evacuation, and
Attorney General Biddle had made a futile objection to Roosevelt that the War Department had
no military basis for the forced exodus of civilians.” 351 This judgment raises the question of who
was in a responsible position with respect to the decision, or, perhaps, what Fahy meant or the
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Court understood by such a comment. The Justice Department defended internment, but it was
initiated by the War Department.
Professor Irons was one of the pioneers in research on the conduct of lawyers in the
exclusion cases. (Ms. Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga was an important researcher as well; it was she
who found the lone remaining copy of the original DeWitt report and noticed the difference from
the revised report). With the coram nobis cases submitted, and in the context of the Korematsu
transcript, he noted that one could argue that the Justice Department had no legal obligation to
disclose the FBI and FCC reports to the Supreme Court because disclosure of all exculpatory
evidence was not then a prosecutorial duty. 352 The Delphic footnote two in the Korematsu brief
thus might not have violated positive law. 353 But Professor Irons found Fahy’s presentation at
argument inexcusable: “Charles Fahy bears the responsibility for persuading the Court to violate
the rights of Fred Korematsu, a man of quiet dignity who waited forty years for his ultimate
vindication.” 354
In the world after September 11, 2001, the internment cases received renewed attention
with respect to American conduct against terrorism. On May 20, 2011, acting Solicitor General
Neal Katyal issued a formal confession of error for the lack of candor the Ninth Circuit found in
the Hirabayashi coram nobis appeal. In an article explaining his decision, Katyal recognized that
in government practice it is common to have to deal with departments holding differing views:
This is a very common thing. It happens today in the government. You have this
dispute between different agencies—the State Department wants one thing, the
Pentagon wants another; or HHS wants one thing, Treasury wants another. The
general counsels often come back to you and they say, “Well, let’s finesse the
issue. Let’s just write something that kind of genuflects to both sides.” They think
it solves the problem, because if you are writing a memo or something like that, it
is a pretty good solution. You just paper over a disagreement. 355
As discussed above, footnote two in the government’s Korematsu brief reflected such an
exercise. Katyal wrote, understandably, “I have read this footnote perhaps thirty times, and I still
do not know what it means.” 356 Like Professor Irons, he specifically faulted Fahy’s argument,
though he felt the broader error was ignoring the calls of Ennis and Burling for greater candor. 357
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D
Late in life, Ennis, Rowe, and Wechsler each discussed whether they should have
resigned in view of the policy the Justice Department was asked to defend. Returning from the
meeting at which it became clear that mass exclusion would occur, Rowe recounts trying to talk
Ennis out of resigning. Ennis later said that at the time he viewed his job as being to argue for his
position but then accept and then carry out whatever decision his superiors made. 358 He also
noted that, had he and Burling resigned, lawyers with fewer reservations and greater willingness
to defer to the military would have even greater influence. 359
Herbert Wechsler offered a distinction based on the exclusion decision itself and the
obligation to defend it. He wrote:
In the Department of Justice it is a fair statement of the case to say that the view
held was that no special security measures were required, that the danger, if there
was a danger, could be met by identifying individuals whom there was cause to
fear and dealing with them in accordance with the law. . . . 360
Noting that Attorney General Biddle “presented this position forcefully” to President
Roosevelt, Wechsler pointed out that the Justice Department did not prevail in that argument but
that Biddle thought—correctly as it turned out—that the Supreme Court would uphold mass
exclusion. 361 Biddle therefore took the position that the Justice Department would not exclude
persons of Japanese ancestry but that the War Department could do so if it was willing to accept
responsibility. 362
Wechsler made clear that President Roosevelt bore ultimate responsibility for the
decision, and posed the question this way:
So the way you have to ask this question is, was there a resigning issue? And if it
was, the time to resign was when the order was made, not at the litigation stage. 363
[T]he interesting question about all this is really the resigning question. When is
the right thing to do to get out, or to put it in another way, when should you feel
compromised by participating at all in a proceeding that may result in sustaining
something that you would feel regret about having sustained? 364
Should I have declined to assume the preparation of a brief in support of the
constitutionality of what the President of the United States had ordered on the
recommendation of his distinguished Secretary of War? I might have done that.
In fact, however, I did not. I did superintend the preparation of that brief. It
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presented the strongest arguments that I felt could be made in support of the
validity of the action taken by the President . . . . 365
I did it because it seemed to me that the separation of function in society justified
and, indeed, required the course of action I pursued; that is to say, that it was not
my responsibility to order or not to order the Japanese evacuation . . . . It was the
responsibility of the President of the United States, who had been elected by the
people of the United States. Neither was it either Mr. Biddle’s responsibility or
my responsibility to determine whether the evacuation was constitutional . . . .
I suggest to you, in short, that one of the ways in which a rich society avoids what
might otherwise prove to be insoluble dilemmas of choice is to recognize a
separation of functions, a distribution of responsibilities, with respect to questions
of that kind, and this is particularly recurrent in the legal profession. 366
*

*

*

The internment decision has many aspects and may be viewed from many angles. One of
them is a willingness to assume responsibility. Ultimate responsibility rested with President
Roosevelt. It is therefore notable that, based on Stimson’s diary, Roosevelt appears to have
delegated the matter to Stimson, leaving only light fingerprints on the decision, though Roosevelt
of course signed EO 9066. 367 In the cabinet-level debates, Biddle argued that the case for
exclusion had not been made, and he said the Justice Department would not participate in
interring citizens, but he stopped short of denouncing the program as unconstitutional. He
accepted what he reported as Roosevelt’s view—that it was a question for the military. Warren
challenged California law enforcement officials by asking rhetorically whether any of them
would want to accept responsibility should exclusion not be pursued and should sabotage then
occur. For all his protests and accusations of “suppression of evidence,” Ennis did not resign but
did attach his signature to the Supreme Court briefs in the exclusion cases. In contrast, Stimson,
McCloy, Gullion, DeWitt, and Bendetsen were willing to accept responsibility for ordering
exclusion and drafting a justification for it. Warren was willing to accept responsibility for
helping create—some might say fabricate--a record that Bendetsen could rely on to justify
DeWitt’s orders.
Warren’s example shows that responsibility is relevant both to what one does and to what
one chooses not to do. 368 In view of his actions, DeWitt and Bendetsen knew that California’s
law enforcement community would back exclusion, and provide testimony and demonstrative
exhibits (the maps) that could be cited as a record justifying exclusion. Contrary views, such as
those of the FBI and FCC, could be dealt with under the general principle that responsible
365
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officials must be given latitude to make judgments among conflicting points of view. As
Solicitor General Katyal noted, such judgments are both necessary and common. One can
imagine a world in which Warren marshalled the California law enforcement community to
attest to the generally law-abiding ways of the Issei and Nisei, and to commit to identifying and
putting an end to unlawful activity by specific persons. One wonders what course policy would
have taken if those most familiar with the land and the people on it opposed exclusion rather than
incited it. But that is not what Warren did.
This note began by surveying California law relating to Black and Indian persons,
including laws against mixed-race marriage. We also have seen President Roosevelt placing
responsibility for decisions with Secretary of War Stimson. It is therefore informative to close
with an excerpt from Stimson’s diary. His entry for Saturday, January 24, 1942—before the
exclusion decision was made—describes his frustration in “trying to stop one of those entirely
unnecessary rat holes which are constantly being thrown into our path by the Administration.”
The issue was a speech to be given by Archibald MacLeish, a well-known poet who was then
Librarian of Congress. MacLeish’s speech was to be “delivered to a colored audience in New
York on the subject of the alleged Negro discrimination by the Navy.” Stimson met with
MacLeish for an hour and “told him how I had been brought up in an abolitionist family; my
father fought in the Civil War, and all my instincts were in favor of justice to the Negro.”
Stimson told MacLeish
of my experience and study of the incompetency of colored troops except under
white officers, and the disastrous consequence to the country and themselves
which they were opening if they went into battle otherwise, although we were
doing our best to train colored officers. I pointed out that what these foolish
leaders of the colored race are seeking is at the bottom social equality, and I
pointed out the basic impossibility of social equality because of the impossibility
of race mixture by marriage.
According to Stimson, MacLeish “listened in silence and thanked me” but “I am not sure how far
he is convinced.” Internment historian Roger Daniels puts the point this way: “racism—a belief
that human races have inherent characteristics that determine their cultures, usually involving the
notion that one’s own race is superior and has the right to rule others—is a seamless web.” 369
V
1. Were the efforts of California lawyers to help persons of Japanese descent evade the
prohibitions of the Alien Land Laws ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
2. Were Attorney General Warren’s efforts to use those laws as a premise for creating a
record to support exclusion ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
3. Was Warren’s agreement to expand his map project and law enforcement meetings
beyond counties where his office thought a case provable under the Alien Land Law
might exist ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
4. Was James Rowe’s reported disclosure to the ACLU that General DeWitt was
contemplating mass exclusion ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
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5. Was Attorney General Biddle’s decision to defer to military officials and to hand the
problem off to them—his choice not to object flatly on constitutional grounds—
ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
6. Was prosecution of Alien Land Law cases after exclusion and internment occurred
ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
7. Was James Purcell’s tactical delay in waiting to press for a decision on Mitsuye
Endo’s habeas petition ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
8. Were Karl Bendetsen’s authorship of the DeWitt report and related actions promoting
exclusion ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
9. Were Edward Ennis’s and John Burling’s reported disclosures to the ACLU
pertaining to Ex parte Endo, and Ennis’s reported consultation with Baldwin
concerning both Endo and Korematsu, ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
10. Was John McCloy’s revision of the original DeWitt report ethical? Was it improper
lawyering?
11. Were Edward Ennis’s and John Burling’s advocacy of disclosure in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu ethical? Were they improper lawyering?
12. Was Herbert Wechsler’s rewriting of note 2 in the Korematsu brief ethical? Was it
improper lawyering?
13. Ennis and Burling signed briefs in Korematsu notwithstanding the absence of
disclosure. Should they have resigned?
14. Was the DOJ’s failure to disclose FBI, FCC, and ONI documents inconsistent with
General DeWitt’s report ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
15. Was coordination between General DeWitt’s staff and West Coast states on those
states’ amicus briefs in Hirabayashi and Korematsu ethical? Was it improper
lawyering?
16. Was the JACL’s use of a WRA non-lawyer employee to write a substantial portion of
the JACL amicus briefs in those cases ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
17. Who were “responsible persons” as referenced by Solicitor General Fahy at the
Korematsu argument?
18. Was Fahy’s Korematsu argument itself ethical? Was it improper lawyering?
19. Should Justice Roberts and Justice Frankfurter have recused themselves in view of
Roberts’s report on Pearl Harbor and the influence it had on exclusion?
20. What kind of a client was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
21. Do you find Professor Wechsler’s reasons for proceeding with the Korematsu brief
persuasive?
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